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On September 4, 1970 Salvador Allende became the first ever demo-
cratically elected Marxist president of Chile. In addition he headed a 
predominantly left-wing coalition government whose program entailed the 
achieving of socialism by peaceful means. 
During the first six months of his administration Allende began 
to carry out a number of his policies in the areas of agrarian reform, 
nationalization of industries, and redistribut..ion of income. These poli-
cies were populist in nature and succeeded in raising the level of support 
for the Unidad Popular government as shown by the results of the April 
1971 Municipal elections. I argue that the results of the Municipal 
elections were a "strong mandate" for Allende to progress from populism 
to a faster and more radical implementation of socialist policies. The 
reality of the situation, however, was one in which Allende became 
increasingly reformist and willing to compromise with the opposition. I 
try to describe and analyze the steadily increasing polarization process 
which was taking place in Chilean society. The Right, with help from the 
United States, was slowly beginning to organize itself against Allende by 
the use of constitutional and violent means. I argue that the United 
States in particular was instrumental in causing economic disruption and 
fueling dissatisfaction with the Unidad Popular. 
The Right's offensive against the government reached high points 
in the "Bosses Strike" of October 1972 and the abortive coup d'etat 
attempted by a section of the armed forces in June 1973. In response to 
these events, the workers mobilized themselves to defend their conununities 
and factories. However, Allende failed to provide the workers' mobiliza-
tions with leader~hip. Instead, he became increasingly reformist and com-
promising with his opponents. 
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During the last year of the Allende administration the polariza-
tion process continued to intensify, and it became clear that the Right 
was commited to the overthrow of the U.P. government. Even so, Allende 
came to rely increasingly on the armed forces for support, a policy which 
proved to be extremely naive as he was overthrown by this aforementioned 
group in September 1973. 
Throughout the paper I attempt to ana].yze the roles played by the 
respective political actors as the polarization process unfo1ded, intensi-
fied, and culminated in the coup d'etat. Those who come in for special 
attention include the United States and the M.I.R. (Movement of the 
Revolutionary Left). 
In addition I make a brief study of the left-wing parties in 
France and Italy at the present time (re: September 1977), and make some 
tentative comparisons with Chile under Allende, and some predictions for 
the future. 
My main sources of data are books, articles, and newspapers, though 
I also make use of United States government documents. This thesis is not 
an empirical study, but is based on closely reasoned arguments which are 
used to support a particular analytical viewpoint. These arguments are 
presented in the form of six hypotheses or propositions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On September 4, 1973 the government of President Salvador 
Allende of Chile was overthrown in a coup d'etat carried out by the 
armed forces. There were a number of forces and factors at work during 
the three years of Allende's administration which contributed to the 
overthrow. In this paper I will try to observe, describe, and most 
importantly, analyze those which I feel were the most significant. The 
Unidad Popular and the revolutionary left. The Christian Democrats, the 
Right and the United States. I intend to investigate and evaluate the 
role that each of these actors played. 
An analysis of the political situation in Chile between 1970 and 
1973 is my main objective, however, it is going to be an analysis con-
ducted from the standpoint of being heavily critical of the Unidad Popular 
and President Salvador Allende. Critical in terms of the government being 
too moderate, too slow to carry out policies and far too willing to com-
promise with the opposition. Throughout the paper I implicitly and expli-
citly argue that the Left, in general, and Allende, in particular, should 
adopt a faster and more .revolutionary-orientated strategy for gaining com-
plete state power. 
In the final chapter I attempt to make some tentative comparisons 
and predictions concerning the present situations in Italy and France 
(October 1977), as they relate to Chile during Allende's administration. 
For the purposes of studying the issues which I have mentioned 
above I formulated a set of six hypotheses or propositions. These two 
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terms will be used synonomously and the use of the former is not meant 
to imply that these positions are based on a rigorous empirical study. 
1) The period irrunediately after the April 1971 
Municipal elections was an opportune time for 
Allende to press forward quickly with the Uni-
dad Popular (U.P.) program. The fact that he 
failed to do so not only showed that his policies 
were basically reformist, but also that his ana-
lysis of the deepening class struggle was incorrect. 
2) As the polarization process i~tensified Allende became 
increasingly reformist and more compromising towards 
the opposition, causing him to miss another oppor-
tunity to move towards the building of a socialist 
society. 
3) Allende misunderstood the intensifying nature of the 
class struggle, and as a result of this, became 
increasingly reliant on the armed forces and hence 
helped bring about his own downfall and that of the 
working class. 
4) The U.S. was directly and indirectly involved in the 
build-up to the coup in Chile and although it was not 
solely responsible for the overthrow, its role must 
in no way be underestimated. 
5) Although the M.I.R. 's activities caused the U.P. to 
move to the left on certain occasions, it cannot be 
held responsible for provoking the Rightist offensive. 
6) The "via Chilena" has important implications for 
European leftists' attempts to come to power, although 
any comparisons and speculations can only be of ·the 
most tentative nature at the present time. 
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The ideas for these propositions came out of the almost unique and 
intriguing aspects connected with the "Chilean experience" of 1970-73. 
Chile can be classified as a developing nation, however, its history and 
character seemed not unlike those of Western democracies. Into this system 
came the first democratically elected Marxist president, heading a left-
wing coalition and seemingly dedicated to transforming Chile into a social-
ist society by peaceful means. Almost the whole of the world's eyes 
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focused on this tiny country to see if such a unique experiment could 
succeed. Not only was it of interest to revolutionaries, but the effect 
of its success or failure would be important, domestically, to left-wing 
parties throughout Latin America and Europe. 
This interest was reflected in the many books and articles written 
about the situation in Chile. From my viewpoint one of the most important 
of these is Revolution and Counter-Revolution~ eds., Paul M. Sweezy and 
Harry Magdoff (New York: Monthly review Press, 1974). 
This book contains articles that had previously been published in 
the independent socialist magazine, "Monthly Review." Most of the articles 
were written before the coup and hence were not written with the benefit 
of hindsight. However, this has not detracted from the book's analytical 
qualities or from its usefulness as a historical record. 
One of the main themes throughout the book is the question of power; 
an absolutely fundamental and extremely important question in any revolu-
tionary situation. The Popular Unity (U.P.) government controlled only 
the executive, and the other branches of government, the legislative, judi-
ciary and armed forces were in the hands of the opposition. These could 
be used as bases from which to counter-attack the U.P. and overthrow it. 
As Zimblast and Stallings point out in a la,er chapter, Allende never 
really worked out a rigorous plan by which to take complete state control. 
The book unfolds in a historical manner and Allende and the U.P. are criti-
cized for their misconceptions concerning the peaceful road to socialism. 
The editors consistently maintain that at some point in the revolutionary 
process, violent confrontation is inevitable. However, Allende failed to 
realize or prepare for it. 
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Disaster in Chile, ed., Les Evans (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974). 
This source compliments Sweezy and Magdoff's collection and is an 
extremely useful book in itself as it consists of a collection of articles 
taken mainly from the international Trotskyist news magazine, Intercon-
tinental Press. As with Revolution and Counter-revolution, most of the 
articles in this book were written at the time the particular events took 
place. Given that as the case, the Trotskyist predictions throughout the 
• 
book are remarkably accurate. The articles stress the reformist nature 
of the U.P., and in particular the CP, and how by their policies, they are 
betraying their own followers--the workers. Other themes revolve around 
the inevitability of violent confrontation, and the need for a popular 
militia and a mass revolutionary party. The writers in this book are 
heavily critical of Allende, more so than Sweezy and Magdoff, for not 
reacting decisively to the dynamics of the class struggle. 
This book makes no pretense of offering a balanced argument, but 
is in fact an analysis of the situation from a mainly Trotskyist viewpoint. 
However, this should no way detract from its literary importance in this 
field. 
No review of literature in this field would be complete without 
this next book as it constitutes a valuable source of background informa-
tion on Salvador Allende. 
Chilean Revolution: Conversations w:i,_th Allende, Regis Debray (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1971). 
The main part of this book consists of a dialogue between Regis 
Debray and Salvador Allende, which took place in January 1971. Conse-
quently, then, this book is different from the preceding two, as it does 
not offer a historical record or an analysis of the Chilean experience. 
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However, it is an important book in that it enables one to gain an 
insight into the background, thoughts and ideas of the founder of the 
Socialist Party and recently confirmed President of Chile. Debray asks 
Allende the questions any revolutionary would pose, and which eve~ts were 
later to answer. Can the peaceful road to socialism succeed? Is violent 
confrontation inevitable, and if so, how will you face it? Allende's 
responses are generally optimistic even in his.appraisal of the future 
actions of the armed forces and the United States. 
The reader comes away with an impression of a sincere, dedicated 
man who believes that he can lead Chile to socialism, though obviously in 
retrospect, some of his ideas and strategies seem heavily tinged with 
naivety. 
James Petras has written a number of interesting articles on Chile, 
and he has also collaborated with Morris Morley to produce a book which 
documents and analyzes the United States involvement in Chile. 
United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende 
Government, James Petras and Horris Morley (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1975). 
This book is the answer to the apologists who have minimized the 
United States' role in Chile. Petras and Morley argue otherwise--that in 
fact the U.S. was deeply involed in the overthrow of Allende. For the most 
part they support their arguments with congressional hearings, mass media 
accounts, and interviews with U.S. officials. However, on certain occa-
sions their rhetoric becomes too ambitious in that some of their claims 
are not substantiated by reference to a primary source. Nevertheless, on 
the whole, this is a convincing book, as the authors put Chilean-U.S. 
relations in their historical perspective and also relate to the larger 
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Latin American context (especially Peru and Brazil). The authors build 
up a realistic picture of U.S. machinations against Chile and the effect 
this had on causing economic and social disruption, political polarization 
and eventually the coup d'etat. 
This book, then, constitutes another piece of material to augment 
the already existing literature on America's global imperialist activitie3. 
U.S. imperialism is also dealt with in•the work done by the North 
American Congress on Latin America (N.A.C.L.A.) 
New Chile, N.A.C.L.A. (Berkeley, California: Waller Press, 1972). 
This book was prepared by the North American Congress on Latin 
America (N.A.C.L.A.), a radical research group, and it acquaints the 
reader with some of the most important issues surrounding the victory of 
the U.P. :i_n the 1970 ele'tions. The two main sections of the book are 
entitled, "The First Year," and "Imperialism and the Old Order." The 
first section covers the first twelve months of the U.P. government, and 
not only does it serve as a useful historical record of this period, but 
it also makes clear its anti-imperialistic viewpoint. This is especially 
noticeable in the articles entitled "The Enemy Within--The Right Responds," 
and "The Carrot and the Stick--U.S. Aid." This theme is continued in the 
second section under titles such as "Brought to You by Uncle Sam, 11 and 
"The Story of Copper and Imperialism." This section is further supple-
mented by some extremely informative material concerning agrarian land 
reform. The N.A.C.L.A researchers also contributed some much needed infor-
mation on the M.I.R. This book contains an article on their activities 
during the early period of the U.P. government and their official response 
to the U.P. victory in 1970. 
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Much "grass roots" research has gone into this book and it pro-
vides a good perspective from which to view and undertake further research 
on the U.P. government and Chilean politics as a whole. 
Allende's Chile, ed., Phillip O'Brien (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976) 
This is one of the more recent books to be written on the Allende 
period in Chile, and the contributions in this book originally arose out 
of a series of specialist seminars held at the Institute of Latin American 
Studies, University of Glasgow. Viewing the articles as a whole, the 
final effect is to provide a very comprehensive coverage of Chilean poli-
tics and society. The first chapter gives an overall analysis of the 
Chilean class structure and class politics. From this background position 
the book concentrates on four main areas. An analysis of the main policies 
of the U.P. government; the response of the working classes; the tactics 
and strategy of those opposed to the U.P. govenrrnent; and finally, a brief 
account of what has been happening in Chile since the coup, and the main 
lessons to be drawn from the Chilean experience. 
Like Revolution and Counter Revolution, and Disaster·in Chile, this 
collection of articles, on the whole, analyzes the situation from a parti-
cular viewpoint. This tends to be one which is often critical of Allende 
and his failure to move at a faster pace and more decisively towards social-
ism. In contrast to the writers in the books mentioned above, O'Brien, at 
times, tends to be more supportive of the U.P.'s overall objectives. 
Most of the articles are detailed and well-documented, and all of 
them were written with the benefit of hindsight. An extermely interesting 
and useful collection of articles. 
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Although I have already given a brief introduction,_in order·vo 
more clearly understand the political situation in Chile during the U.P. 
government, a brief understanding of the historical background is also 
necessary.· 
As I am not attempting to give a thorough historical analysis of 
Chilean politics, I will only go back as far as 1938, the year of the 
Popular Front's election victory. The Popular•Front was a very broad 
alliance indeed and was composed of radicals, socialists, democrats 
(members of the Democratic Party), and communists, who came together in 
the wake of severe repressive measures meted out by President Alessandri. 
Not only this but there was a substantial Nazi movement operating in Chile 
at this time, and consequently, the Popular Front's specific aim was to 
campaign to ensure the election of a candidate who believed in democracy. 
The Popular Front ruled for the next fourteen years in a number 
of different guises, with each government being more conservative than the 
last. From this the socialist Left of the 1970's learned an important 
lesson, "not to accept as presidential candidate, someone from the least 
revolutionary of the parties even though that person might have widespread 
1 popular support." Pedro Aguire Cerda, who was elected President on 
October 25, 1938, typified this. He was a member of the Radical Party; 
the party which supplied 35 percent of the Popular Front's strength in 
Cow.gress and held six of eleven cabinet posts. Cerda and other bourgeois 
elements in the Front were afraid of being too radical in their program 
and hence nothing really .changed. The masses, who's ideals and hopes had 
voted the Front into power, were seriously disillusioned. In addition, 
the Left were not united at this time and consequently, no mass mobiliza-
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tions were organized to protest against the leadership. Another lesson 
that the socialist Left in the 1970's should have learned more keenly 
from this was that, "the unity of the working class and other democratic 
forces cannot be sustained only by the means of pacts and agreements made 
at leadership levels, but that it is the continuous organization and 
mobilization of the working class that really counts." 2 
The masses, then, became very disillusioned with the Popular Front 
and this feeling of disenchantment helped to usher in Carlos Ibanez (a 
former dictator of Chile), as president in 1952. He served as head of the 
government until 1958, during which time he tied the Chilean economy more 
and more closely to the United States. However, depression, social insta-
bility and inflation worsened after World War II, and the IMF's plan of 
austerity was not welcomed by the Chilean workers. In 1954 and 1955 the 
number of strikes continued to rise, and these elicited hard repressive 
measures from Ibanez. Going into the 1958 election campaign a large 
section of the Chilean population were disenchanted with the prevailing 
socio-economic conditions and Ibanez's repressive policies and capitalist 
experiments. The Left became united as the Popular Action Front (F.R.A.P.). 
In the election, Salvador Allende, founder of the Socialist Party, and 
losing presidential candidate in 1952, came very close to winning. This 
election also brought into prominence, Eduardo Frei, founder of the 
Christian Democratic Party, who garnered 21 percent of the vote. However, 
Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the Right, became president, beating 
Allende by only 33,500 votes. In 1964 F.R.A.P. again contested the elec-
tions; this time it consisted mainly of the Communist and Socialist parties, 
plus the addition of the Radical Party, and some small independent left-
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wing forces. Howeverj Eduardo Frei, the candidate of the Christian Demo-
crats, won a convincing victory with 56.1 percent of the vote, as against 
Allende's 38.9 percent. 3 
During the 1960's the .F.R.A:P. disintegrated, and in 1969 a new 
alliance was born, Popular Unity. Its composition was to change slightly 
during its period in government;, however, its original membership was as 
follows: the three main parties were the Co~unist Party (CP), Socialist 
Party (PS), and the Radical Party (PR). In addition, there were three 
movements: United People's Action Movement (M.A.P.U.), a leftist offshoot 
of the Christian Democratic Party; Independent People's Action (A.P.I.); 
and the Social Democrats. The latter two movements are both micro-
organizations of the center-left. 4 In 1970 this coalition contested the 
elections and this time Allende won a plurality of the popular vote and 
became President-elect of Chile. 
The results of the 1970 Presidential election were: 5 
Allende 
Alessandri 
Tamie 
Null and Blank 
1,070,334 
1,031,159 
821,801 
(36.2%) 
(34.9%) 
(27.8%) 
( 1.1%) 
The U.P., though, should not be seen as a direct descendant of the 
1938 Popular Front, because in actual fact there was substantial difference 
between th,cm. The latter was a broad coalition of parties and platforms 
which come together to fight fascism. Also, it never envisaged the destruc-
tion of capitalism, as its succession of conservative leaders and policies 
showed. The Popular Unity was a more unified and cohesive coalition, which 
broadly agreed on its objectives, the carryin6 out of the U.P. program and 
a move towards socialism in Chile. 6 The Popular Front of 1938, though, 
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can be credited with helping to set a historical precedent, of sorts, for 
the U.P., and also to give it a chance to learn from their failures. 
!n terms of trying to given an historical introduction to the 
Popular Unity period, I think it is also necessary to briefly discuss the 
seemingly Rarad·oxical situation in which the Communist Party were politi-
cally to the right of the Socialists. The CP was founded back in June 
1912 under the name of the Socialist Workers Party (POS), and it was not 
until after the Russian Revolution in 1917 that they became the Connnunist 
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Party of Chile. It took another ten years before they adopted the 
Leninist doctrine of democratic centralism. The CP was the first nation-
wide working class organization in Chile and it built up strong support 
in the trade unions. 
In 1933 a new force emerged on the Left in chile, the Socialist 
Party, and its origins required it to occupy a position to the left of 
the CP. 
In 1931 Ibanez' first administration was overthrown and the CP had 
become very noticeable as a result of the Stalinist-Trotskyist feud in the 
Comintern..' 8 Eventually, then, the Trotskyite elements split from the 
Chilean CP and left them to their Stalinist line. The Trotskyists joined 
with a number of other left-wing groups to form the Socialist Party. Pre-
viously these groups had separately supported the twelve-day Republic of 
Marmeduke Grove and Eugenio Matte in 1932. The Socialist Party, then, was 
mainly made up of those whose idelogical affiliation was to the left of 
Stalin, and although the SP was Marxist, it did not follow the doctrine 
of democratic centralism. 9 
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CHAPTER I 
THE FIRST SIX MONTHS: A POPULIST PROGRAM 
Hypothesis: The period immediately after the April 1971 Municipal elec-
tions was an opportune time for Allende to pr~ss forward quickly with the 
Unidad Popular (U.P.) program. The fact that he failed to do so, not only 
showed that his policies were basically reformist, but also that his ana-
lysis of the deepening class struggle was incorrect. 
With the electoral victory of Allende in September 1970 and his 
ratification by Congress in the following November, Chile, at least 
potentially, moved into the beginnings of the road towards socialism. 
However, this potential was not developed by Allende and the U.P., and 
in reality they carried out what were basically reformist policies. The 
only sectors who recognized the urgency of pushing forward quickly through 
this prerevolutionary stage were the "ultra-left," which included the left-
wing of the Socialist Party, the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), 
and the masses who supported them. 
The use of the term, "reformist," here does not mean that Allende's 
policies were exactly the same as Frei' s had been. 1'.Thereas Frei' s "Revolu-
tion in Liberty" ha•.' been openly reformist, the U .P. program had under-
1 . ·1 d f -~f l ying potentia to move towar some rearrangement o soc1a1 orces. As 
James Petras said, "By the midd]e of 1971, the government had taken a series 
of measures which, while in themselves not implying a qualitative change in 
2 
social relatir,ns, definitely pointed in that direction." 
13 
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In this chapter I intend to study the policies and programs of 
the U.P. from September 1970 until shortly after the April 1971 municipal 
elections. I will try to show that during this period, although the poli-
cies Allende carried out were reformist in nature, in the context of the 
Chilean political environment, many of them did represent a step forward 
for the working classes. However, I also intend to show that although 
they were a step forward for the workers, Allepde's analysis of the situ-
ation prevented the qualitative acceleration of this process and the con-
struction of a through-going socialist program. It was stated in the 
Uni dad Popular Program of Government that the, 11'tl~w economy .•• will play 
an extremely important role. 113 Consequently, it is on this that I will 
initially concentrate. Three types of economic areas were envisaged, the 
first one being the "Area of Social Property." This entailed the construc-
tion of a dominant state area made up of already-controlled state enter-
prises plus those that were to be expropriated. Initially this called 
for the nationalization of the basic sources of wealth in Chile, i.e., 
the large mining companies of copper, iron, nitrate and others, which 
were controlled by foreign capital and internal monopolies. Into this 
area of nationalized activities will be integrated the following sectors: 
1. The large mining companies of copper, nitrate, 
iodine, iron and coal; 
2. The country's financial system, especially private 
banks and insurance companies; 
3. Foreign trade; 
4. The great distribution enterprises and monopolies; 
5. The strategic industrial monopolies; 
6. In general, all those activities which determine 
the country's economic and social development such 
as the production and distribution of electrical 
energy; rail, air and maritime transportation; com-
munications; the production, refining and distribu-
tion of petroleum and its derivatives--including 
bottled gas; iron and steel production; cement, 
petrochemicals and heavy chemicals, cellulose and 
paper.4 
The other two economic areas were private property and mixed pro-
perty, respectively. The former category would consist of all sectors 
of industry, mining, agriculture and services other than those which had 
'controlled the market monopolistically, monopolizing state aid and bank 
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credit and exploiting the other industrial enterprises of the country." 
The third area, the "Mixed Area," involved a partnership between 
private and state enterprises. This plan to c.:instruct a new economy was 
seen as the mainstay of the U.P. program, though some of its other objec-
tives must also be briefly discussed. Income redistribution by means of 
wage and price policies, in the direction of the lower levels of the popu-
lation, is one of these. In the domestic field the U.P.'s third major 
committment was to carry out large-scale agrarian reform, primarily by 
breaking up the latifundios. In terms of foreign policy and international 
objectives, Allende pledged "complete political and economic autonomy of 
Chile ... diplomatic relations with all the countries of the world irre-
spective of their political position and ideology ... more national inde-
pendence ..• and international solidarity with people's struggle for libera-
• II 6 tion ..• 
The rhetoric of the U.P. program may sound revolutionary and may 
sound socialistic, but in terms of the spirit in which its measures were 
i.nterpreted and implemented, they remained populist and reformist. This 
should come as no surprise if one studies the programs and their implemen-
tation, and Allende's political background. Allende was the founder of 
the Chilean Socialist Party, and was also its perennial. candidate· for Presi-
d . 1952 h h d f · 1 · · 7 ent since , at t e ea o varying coa itions. In addition he had 
also been a senator for twenty-five years. 8 Allende himself, then, was 
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steeped in democratic traditions and had functioned with and within bour-
geois political institutions. Consequently then, when Congress imposed 
constitutional limitations upon Allende, as part of the bargain for his 
ratification as president, he accepted them. These conditions or consti-
tutional amendments were proposed by the Christian Democratic Party. These 
involved:'- the non-interference by the president in the army, navy, air 
force, or carabineros; non-interference with ~he press, radio, schools, 
unions, etc., and significantly, the recognition of the unconstitutionality 
of "private militias." As Dudley Seers pointed out, "Allende pledged that 
he would respect the constitutional guarantees .... These were not difficult 
pledges to give. H 1 d · d . . 1· 119 e was area y cornrnitte to constitutiona ity. The 
opposition parties in congress did not insist on these constitutional 
guarantees because they thought that without them, Allende would overthrow 
the existing system. Obviously not, because, if they viewed Allende as a 
true revolutionary, they would not have wasted their time drawing up what 
would have been, worthless constitutional amendments. However, they knew 
from his background that a complete overthrow of capitalism was not a point 
of contention. Their aim was to shift certain constitutional powers away 
from the presidency and towards them--thereby strengthening their position 
for the future. 
The reformism and respect for legal and democratic processes was 
reflected in the make-up of the Unidad Popular coalition. Some writers, 
such as Les Evans, exaggerate the reformist effects the A.P.I. (Independent 
Peoples Action) and the Radical Party had on the U.P. coalition. 10 Admit-
tedly the API was a center-left group and the Radical Party was bourgeois·,-
bent on political opportunism. However, these two groups did not form a 
large percentage of the total U.P. coalition. The two main parties, the 
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Socialists and the Communists, were solidly based on the working class. 
I agree with Evans though that the U.P. was not socialist in practice, 
but in fact, reformist. Given the rhetoric of the program, however, and 
the increasing radicalization of the masses, stagnation at the beginning 
of the prerevolutionary stage was not inevitable. Notwithstanding Allende 
himself, Evans saw the brake as being the bourgeois parties in the coali-
tion, whereas I would maintain that the Chile.n Communist Party was best 
suited to fit this role as explained in the introduction. The C.P. was 
in many ways the most highly organized and pow,:>.rful party in the coali-
tion; however, it was also to the right of Allende's Socialist Party. 
Even more than the S.P. leaderr,hip, the C.P. stressed constitutionality 
and legalism, and was prone to advocate slower rather than faster imple-
mentation of the U.P. program. 11 As Kyle Steenland put it, "The attitude 
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of the C.P. has crippled the U.P. 
Reformism, then, was seemingly built into the institutional and 
ideological framework of the coalition. However, ac. will be seen, this 
reformism was underlayed by a potential to move in a socialist direction. 
Consequently, although the measures of the first six months can be criti-
cized for their reformism, early reforms could have been used as a base 
to move more rapidly towards increased state power and the construction 
of socialism. This became increasingly clear upon studying the measures 
carried out by the U.P. during the first six months. 
A number of popular measures were initiated almost immediately, 
such as wage increases of at least 30 percent for workers and lower-level 
salaried employees, coupled with a simultaneous freezing of prices. Health 
services were improved; a number of political prisoners were freed and riot 
police were abandoned. And "in December 1970 Allende began his well-
18 
publicized free distribution of half a liter of milk for all children. In 
November and December the U.P. gave away land for popular resorts to 
poor schools and to the central labor cot.mcil." 13 From this necessary 
popular politiking, Allende's aim was to extend his electoral victory by 
implementing short-run economic measures which would consolidate his pre-
sent support and also attract new support. 
In terms of agrarian reform the U.P. ,romised the Chilean peas-
antry, "a real agrarian reform, which would fulfill the betrayed pledges 
of the Christian Democrats, while deepening and extending the rural revo-
lution.1114 During the first six months the U.P. appropriated 3.5 million 
acres of land, which represented almost 40 percent of the land area that 
the Christian Democrats expropriated in six years. Its avowed aim was 
to end all latifundism by 1973. The U.P. reforms in the area of land 
reform represented an advance for the agricultural workers and peasants. 
However, the above figures must be viewed in the light of the fact that 
this was not really a change from the policy of Eduardo Frei, but merely 
an extension of it. In fact, the land was expropriated under the terms 
of the P.D.C.'s own land reform law of 1967. In addition, Allende assured 
landowners that they would be paid compensation for their land. Land 
reform under Allende, then, cannot be viewed as a socialistic measure, 
but more of a social democratic measure. 
As so often was to be the case, Allende fot.md that his reformism 
(however much he felt it was orientated towards· the W"orkers"-an&.·peasan.ts), 
lagged behind the dy~aroism of the masses. This was clearly shown by the 
"illega1" land seizures which began almost immediately after the U.P. came 
to power and continued at an increasing pace. MacEoin notes that, "By 
early 1971, hundreds of farms were being seized each month by groups of 
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peasants." These land seizures centered around the southern province 
of Cautin, which had Chile's largest concentration of Indians, the coun-
try's densest and poorest rural population, and the highest incidence of 
rural unemployment. The mobilization of the Indians and peasants was 
organized in part by a section of the MIR, about whom more will be dis-
cussed later. In order not to lose the strong support that they com-
manded from the masses, the U.P. was pressure~ by these events to speed 
up the expropriation process, and also to refrain from using actual phy-
sical force to prevent these seizures. After a time, however, Jose Toha, 
the U.P. Minister of the Interior, gave a warning that "the government of 
President Senor Allende would act vigorously against any armed group 
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operating in rural areas." 
Mining industries were also expropriated by the U.P. within the 
first six months; the most important being the huge U.S.-owned copper 
mines, the latter being nationalized by the middle of July 1971. In much 
of the North American press, nationalization is synonomous with socialism, 
however, this was certainly not the case in Chile. Almost all sectors of 
Chilean society agreed upon the need to nationalize copper in terms of 
furthering national industrial development and reducing dependence upon 
foreign capital. The consensus that ~xisted in relation to these measures 
was begun under Frei's government, by virtue of their Chileanization pro-
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cess. This was extended under the U.P.'s governmental program. How-
ever, as Laurence Whitehead pointed out, " ... total copper nationalization 
was proposed not only by Allende, but also by his Christian Democratic 
1 . 11 18 riva for the Presidency, Radomiro Tamie ... Even Aressandri, who did 
not genuinely favor nationalization, tacitly supported it, in view of the 
widespread support for it right across the political spectrum. 
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As can be seen, then, from the nature of its support, nationali-
zation of U.S. copper cannot be viewed as a socialistic measure. However, 
again it does not represent another victory for the masses, the limited 
nature of which though needs to be stressed. MacEoin maintained that the 
process of "Chileanization" was dropped in favor of nationalization 
because "Chile's ownership of 51 percent of the shares gave it no voice 
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in management or policy." This is certainl),'9 true, however, the gains 
to be made from total nationalization of copper must not be exaggerated. 
As Evans pointed out "nationalization in and of itself does not mean that 
the working class is in power or that capitalism is being eliminated. 1120 
As with the policies concerning agrarian reform, the above nationalizations 
only helped to create preconditions from which the beginnings of socialism 
could be built. In no way did they themselves constitute socialism. This 
lack of structural change was further reflected in the very small number 
of monopoly industrial enterprises that were nationalized. The U.P.'s 
policy by mid-1971 seemed to be one of intervention only in those enter-
prises which had paralyzed production. However, "The government has not 
yet specified what industries it plans to expropriate nor has it estab-
lished a time sequence. 1121 It was estimated that 150 enterprises among 
the 30,000 firms and workshops were monopolies to be expropriated. This 
represented less than 1 percent. 
The banks were also taken over, eleven of them by April 1971, and 
all of them by the end of July 1971. With control of the banking and 
financial stTucture, the potential was there to fund and develop future 
socialistic policies. 
In the first six months, the U.P. was relatively successful in 
implementing the economic core of its program in terms of both its own 
goals and guidelines. 
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On April 4, 1971, 280 municipal elections were held, and as they 
were the first public test of Allende's administration, they took on the 
nature of a plebiscite, for or against the program of the U.P. The 
results reflected the U.P.'s growing support. 
CHILEAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 197122 
.Number Percent 
Partido Socialista 631,939 22. 89 
Partido Communista 479,206 17.36 
Partido Radical 225,851 8.18 
Socialista Popular 29,123 1.05 
Social Democrata 38,077 1.38 
Total, Unidad Popular 1,404,196 50.86 
Partido Democrata Cristiano 723,623 26.21 
Partido Nacional 511,679 18.53 
Democracia Radical 108,192 3.91 
Democrata Nacional 13,435 0.49 
1,356,929 49.14 
Not only was this a personal victory for Allende, but it was also, 
"a strong mandate. 1123 Allende's ow.'1 Socialist Party made the biggest 
gains by garnering 22.89 percent of the vote and becoming the second 
largest party in Chile. Not only this but it represented a 65 percent 
increase over the vote it received in the 1967 municipal elections. In 
contrast the bourgeois wing of the U.P. fared badly, its vote dropping 
from 16.1 percent to 8.1 percent over the same period of time. The table 
below shows the increasing support for Chilean left-wing parties since 1964. 
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THE LEFTS' RISING PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULAR VOTE 1965-7124 
Congressional Municipal Cdngressional Municipal 
The Parties 1965 1967 1969 1971 
Socialist Party 10.3 13.9 12.2 22.89 
Communist Party 12.4 14.7 15. 9 17.36 
Radical Party 13.3 16.1 13.0 8.1 
C. D. Party 42.3 35.6 29.8 26.21 
National Party 12. 1 14.3 20.0 18. 53 
Not only did the results legitimize the U.P. victory but they 
could have been interpreted as representing an increase in support for 
the views of the left-wing section of the U.P. The left-wing of the 
Socialist Party, and the MIR, saw this trend outlined above, and particu-
larly the April municipal election results as a mandate to move forward 
with the implementation of the U.P. program. Paul Sweezy puts forward a 
logical and constitutional process by which Allende could have moved 
forward. 
A draft law abolishing the two-house legislature 
and substituting the proposed Popular Assembly 
could have been submitted to the Congress. It 
would, of course, have been rejected, thus paving 
the way for a plebiscite. If the U.P. had then 
waged an aggressive campaign educating the voters 
on the underlying issues and raising their poli-
tical consciousness it is reasonable to assume 
that the April majority could have been held and 
perhaps even increased. The next step would have 
been to win a majority of seats in the new Popular 
Assembly. With this accomplished, not only could 
vitally important legislation which had been blocked 
by the old Congress be enacted; equally significant 25 
the judiciary could have been reformed and re-staffed. 
In its quest for state power the U.P. would then be left to deal with the 
military. This would be more complicated and difficu]t, however, a legal 
and constitutional path could still be followed. Reactionary officers 
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could be retired and loyal officers promoted. Pay and living conditions 
for the rank and file could be improved, and the military link between 
the U.S. and Chile could be broken. Also of extreme importance would be 
the construction of a popular militia. A recognition of the fact that at 
some stage violent action may be necessary. 
The writer on page 26 of New Chile misinterpreted Allende's aims 
and analysis of the situation after April 197\. The writer in question 
maintained that "Allende clearly regarded the results of the municipal 
elections as a signal for him to move more directly towards the goals set 
out in the U.P. Program of Government." In reality, this was not the case; 
Allende did not proceed to implement the U.P. program in any way that bears 
similarity to Sweezy's suggested scenario. The line that Allende did 
actually follow post-April 1971 and the subsequent events will be dis-
cussed in a later chapter. At this point I intend to argue for why I 
think Allende should have pressed forward rapidly with his programs at 
this point, and also to try and offer some answers as to why he didn't. 
As the municipal elections showed, Allende and his Socialist Party 
had, through a number of reformist and populist measures, increased signi-
ficantly their level of popular support. This support in a large part 
came from the success of the short run economic policies discussed 
earlier, as these were aimed primarily at the working class and the lower 
sections of the middle classes. Not only this but the masses had shown 
themselves willing to mobilize and to push forward the U.P. program at a 
fast pace. Allende was also well-versed from his student days with the 
writings of Marx, Lenin, and also Trotsky. 26 He must have been well aware 
of the danger of moving toward the revolution too slowly. Unless the 
speed of implementation and general momentum are maintained and increased, 
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then the revolutionary process will falter, lose momentum, and be vuner-
able to attacks by the beurgeoisie, Rosa Luxemburg makes this point 
clearly, " ... either the revolution must advance at a rapid, stormy and 
resolute tempo, break down all barriers with an iron hand, and place its 
goals ever farther ahead, or it is quite soon thrown backward. 1127 
In addition, the class struggle was beginning to come into the 
open. Polarization was slowly beginning to t~ke place and hence if Allende 
wanted to move forward constitutionally, then it had to be done before the 
classes became completely polarized. Ever since the election on September 
4, a slow simmering, but steady process of polarization of classes had been 
taking place in Chile. Events on both the right and left show this. The 
presence of the center/right and its links with the U.S. were clearly 
demonstrated to Allende in the 1964 Presidential election. "Frei's cam-
paign [was] designed to scare the electorate away from Allende. With up 
to $1 million per month from U.S. sources,1128 Laurence Stern maintained 
that "Approximately $20 million in U.S. funds was channeled into the Frei 
campaign, while at least 100 U.S. 'special personnel' were posted to 
Chile. 1129 The report goes on to quote a key U.S. intelligence officer of 
the time, who recalled that, "U.S. government intervention in Chile in 1964 
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was blatant and almost obscene." The amount of money pumped into Chile 
in the next six years by U.S. government and corporations increased sub-
stantially, with a politically motivated aim--to directly and indirectly 
prevent the election of a socialist candidate in 1970. However, their 
failure to prevent this occurrence did not signal an end to U.S. machin-
ations. Under the Nixon administration the "40 Committee," as it was 
known, orchestrated and authorized a program of bribes and payments to 
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anti-Allende groups in Chile to prevent his ratification by Congress. 31 
The CIA and U.S. corporations such as I.T.T. were involved in similar 
activities. William Merriam, I.T.T. Executive Representative for Inter-
national Trade, summarized a meeting at CIA headquarters. "Approaches 
continue to be made to select members of the Armed Forces in an attempt 
to have them lead some sort of uprising--no success to date. 1132 Following 
this, the United States strategy moved to a d{fferent plane and the offen-
sive was continued in the economic area with the purpose of creating the 
right political and economic conditions necessary to precipitate a coup. 
"A consensus emerged between Kissinger, the CIA and I.T.T. The conver-
gence of views was reached shortly after Allende was confirmed in the 
Presidency: by common consent the strategy consisted of maximizing 
external economic pressures on the vunerable points of the Chilean 
economy. 1133 Economic sabotage by the Right was also being carried out 
on the domestic front. Wealthy Chileans by the hundreds were withdrawing 
their savings. From September 1970 onwards, capital flight began. Also, 
"the inflow of capital from abroad stopped in September and new domestic 
private investment practically halted." 34 The conservative press publi-
cized the difficulties caused by this in anti-socialist tones, and land-
owners continued to sabotage the U.P. program by using all their means to 
block and discredit land reform. 
The assassination of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General 
Rene Schneider, on October 22, 1970, was another reminder to Allende that 
he was dealing with an opposition which was prepared to use subtle and 
unsubtle means to bring about his downfall. Although not working together 
in any cohesive manner, the differing elements on the right were united on 
one thing, opposition to Allende. This opposition was present before the 
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September elections and continued to grow after it, through covert and 
overt actions (a number of which have been mentioned above). As yet 
rightist opposition was not unified or mobilized on any large and organ-
ized scale; this was not to happen until the Bosses Strike of 1972. 
However, the portents for the future were clear. The power of the 
right with backing from the U.S. could not be underestimated. They were 
slowly growing in strength and in unity, bidi~g their time until they 
felt that conditions were favorable for them to strike at the Allende 
government. The conditions or situations they were primarily interested 
in were those of the other slowly polarizing sector of Chilean society--
the working class. 
The masses then, were also going through a polarization process; 
the evidence of which showed itself clearly in the results of the munici-
pal elections. The Socialist Party in the coalition significantly increased 
its vote. The "ultra left" wanted the socialist spirit of the U.P. program 
to be carried out to the socialist letter. The land seizures already dis-
cussed demonstrated that concrete action was what was wanted, and fast. 
Also, workers in industries during the first few months demanded from 
Allende that they be allowed to take over and run the factories. Much of 
the initial workers' demands and mobilizations occurred with backing from 
the MIR, the revolutionary left group, which gave critical support to the 
35 U.P. program. The masses, after years of poor living and exploitation, 
saw the Allende government and the measures that it had already carried 
out, as a sign, a hope, a path ou~ of poverty. By virtue of their life 
experiences pre-U.P. government and their present rising expectations, 
they developed a sense of urgency which could not always be contained 
within the legal, constitutional reforms put forward by Allende. 
27 
A radicalization and polarization, then, has been taking place 
among the workers, and again the writing was on the wall for Allende. If 
he could not move at the same speed as the masses then they would leave 
him behind. This was especially true in the area of building a popular 
militia. The workers did not have the same faith in the neutrality of 
the military and police as Allende seemed to have. His refusal to arm 
and/or mobilize the masses on any continuous ~asis, pushed the masses 
even more into the arms of the MIR. Allying with this group became a 
natural progression as their radicalization and polarization increased. 
Unfortunately, the MIR were also incapable of providing the type of 
leadership necessary to build a mass revolutionary movement. 
I have tried to illustrate here that during the first six months 
the polarization process was beginning to occur, but as yet had not reached 
coup d' etat conditions. The forces of the Right were still partially dis-
oriented by Allende's presidential victory; however, they were increasingly 
beginning to agree on a basic strategy. One of the reasons they were still 
disoriented over their strategy was the problem of how to deal·with the 
increasing mass support for Allende, which itself was radicalizing and 
polarizing. 
In summary, then, Allende had conditions in his favor, post-April 
1971, economically and politically. Why then did he not press on and 
quickly implement the U.P. program? 
Without doubt there were a number of factors which accounted for 
this~ however, one of the main ones revolved around Allende's mistaken 
analysis of the situation. Allende's long-standing respect for constitu-
tionalism, legality and bourgeois institutions, overshadowed one of the 
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basic tenets of the philosophy he himself advocate4. In his conversa-
tions with Regis Debray, Allende said, " ... we have not forgotten a funda-
mental principle of Marxism: 36 the class struggle." However, his failure 
to implement the U.P. program after the April 1971 election illustrates 
that his analysis of the situation showed a severe misreading of the 
class struggle and the polarization process. For an avowed Marxist, 
Allende did not have a very clear picture of \he role of the military. 
On the one hand, he half-believed the now shattered myth of the apolitical 
and non-interventionist nature of the Chilean armed forces. "I have abso-
lute confidence in the loyalty of the armed forces. Our forces are pro-
fessional forces at the service of the state, of the people. 1137 However, 
the military statistics were ominous. In relation to its population, 
Chile had the largest armed forces of any South American country, and was 
also the largest recipient of U.S. military aid, outside of Brazil. Chile 
also received substantial military training from the U.S. (much of which 
was carried out in the U.S.). For example, for the period 1960-65, 2,064 
Chilean soldiers were trained in the u.s. 38 
Alain Joxe, a French sociologist, concluded, after a study of the 
Chilean armed forces, that it is not that they are apoliti(·al, but that 
they usually manage to play their role inconspicuously. Their non-
intervention is "a latent and permanent participation in the political 
game, not a simple abstention. When they intervene, as in 1891 and from 
1924-1931, they remodel the state to serve the upper and middle sectors 
and the bureacracy. One intervention in Chile is worth ten in other 
countries." 
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The other half of Allende's mistaken analysis stemmed from his 
fear of provoking military intervention by the armed forces by pushing 
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forward too quickly with the U.P. program. The analysis was mistaken again 
in that as the polarization of classes continued, violent intervention at 
some stage was inevitable. A more realistic analysis would have been to 
realize that violent confrontation would have to occur, and consequently 
must be prepared for. The optimum time to prepare for such an eventuality 
was again after the April 1971 elections. 
However, Allende, although an avowed ijarxist, failed to diagnose 
the class struggle in Marxist terms. The April 1971 elections, the end 
of the first six months in power, marked a tremendous opportunity for 
Allende, and the workers to move toward a construction of the beginnings 
of socialism. 
However, he failed to do so, and as a result of the path he did 
follow, he left the very people who supported him, the workers, open and 
vulnerable to the intensifying Rightist offensive. 
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CHAPTER II 
ALLENDE'S REFORMISM CONTINUES AS THE POLARIZATION PROCESS INTENSIFIES 
Hypothesis: As the polarization proce3s intensified Allende became 
increasingiy reformist and more compromising towards the opposition, 
causing him to miss another opportunity to move towards the buildi~g 
of a socialist society. 
The full significance of the April 1971 municipal elections only 
became fully apparent upon a closer study of the changing electoral vote 
of the political parties in Chile. Referal back to the table on page 10, 
Chapter I, helps to show this in part. In the last chapter I used the 
data in the table to show the rising percentage of the popular vote gar-
nered by the Left from 1965-71. However, a second examination of the 
results showed a growing pola1·ization of the Chilean population. The 
traditional workers parties, the Socialist and Communist parties, both 
increased their percentage share of the vote in the last two congressional 
and municipal elections. Not only this but the conservative National Party 
also made significant gains, partly at the expense of the P.D.C. and partly 
at the expense of the smaller parties. In fact, its percentage gain from 
the 1965-69 Congressional elections was larger than both the Socialist and 
Communist respective gains put together. These results and the ensuing 
political maneuvers within and outside the U.P., reflected the growing 
politicization and polarization that had been taking place. Lawrence 
notes this polarization process. 
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Another important change in the Chilean political 
climate is the polarization of the electorate and 
the political leadership. This polarization can 
be seen in a variety of ways, in the inflamed poli-
tical rhetoric of the 1960's, the serious increase 
in political violence, the platforms of the major 
competing 1arties, and the results of the recent 
elections. 
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The varied makeup of the component parts of the U.P. and its lack 
of unity of purpose was shown by the increasing fragmentation of some of 
its members. On August 31, 1971, the Radical Party convention ended in a 
split among its ranks; a new group being formed called the Independent 
Radical Movement (Movimiento Radical Independiente-MRI). In addition the 
P.D.C. und•erwent another split in that M.A.P.U. lost a number of top leaders 
to the new Christian Left (Izquierda Cristiana). The most notable of these 
leaders being Jacques Chonchol, the Minister of Agriculture. Both the 
Christian Left and the MRI gave support to the Allende government, however, 
the latter eventually went over to the ranks of the opposition. At this 
time, then, the U.P. government was on the way to becoming "little more 
than a convenient label attached to whatever combination of parties and 
groups may from time to time support the Allende administration." 2 
Not only was polarization reflected in electoral trends and poli-
tical maneuverings, but in other Left/Right mobilizations also. The MIR 
interpreted the U.P. gains in the April elections as a reason to move 
forward and increase its organizational activities among the masses of 
students, peasants, and workers. MIR spokesmen claimed that their wember-
ship had quadrupled and that they were increasingly becoming the moving 
f . 1 · k d · · 3 orce in new revo utionary wor ers an peasants organizations. Some 
MIRistas claimed that they could put from twenty to thirty thousand people 
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into battle immediately, armed with weapons stolen from armories during 
the past three years, and trained during people's militia training ses-
· d · h 4 sions uring t e past year. Its strength was impressively demonstrated 
at the funeral service for one of their most important leaders, Luciana 
Cruz, who died in a car accident on August 14. Thirty thousand people 
marched through the streets in his funeral - procession, n{fu-ting those 
who predicted that the MIR would disappear if .it didn't join the ranks 
of the U.P. 115 The retention of this support, and the increasing autonomy 
of the workers movement was shown by the setting up of a "People's 
Assembly" in July 1972. This brought together many of the working class 
groups and organizations to discuss the concept and implementation of 
"people's power." 
Without doubt the "ultraleft" was increasing its mobilization 
activities, and as polarization continued so its supporters increased in 
number. Part of these activities were aimed at penetrating the army's 
lower echelons in an attempt to split and weaken the armed forces. However, 
in the area of the armed forces, the terrorist groups of the Right had more 
influence in the shape of "Patria y Libertad" (Fatherland and Freedom), 
"Grupo Anticomrnunista" (G:&-.A. {;,Cl.:.. anti- comniuri:ist gro-tip) · and NECif"{We Jon' t 
sell out Chile). These all had strong links with the upper ranks of the 
army. The battle lines were being drawn by both the extreme left and 
right. But whereas the "moderate left", in the shape of the U.P. Jeader-
ship, was continuing its strategy of adhering to the Constitution, the 
Christian Democrats were increasingly throwing their weight behi.nd the 
conservative right. The summer of 1971 marked the beginnings of a closer 
alliance between the aforementioned parties, both in and outside of Con-
gress. 
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In October 1971 the P.D.C. and the rightist parties attempted to 
assert legislative control over the expansion of the public sector by 
means of a constitutional amendment which Allende refused to accept. By 
January 1972 "Frei. •• returned to active political campaigning to 'save 
democracy' by means of a fully fledged e_lectoral and congressional alli-
ance with the Right, and the Christian Democrats approved their first 
impeachment of one of Allende's ministers. 116 t>n the electoral front an 
informal alliance of the P.DC and the conservative right led to striking 
victories for them in two January Congressional by-elections. Apart from 
being a political setback for Allende, it had added significance in that 
the opposition had ran on the platform of giving the voters an opportunity 
"to take a stand against the government's program to construct socialism 
in Chile. 117 The cementing of relations on the right was further demon-
strated by the formation of C.O.D.E. (Confederation Democratica), whose 
job was to prepare joint lists for the March 1973 Congressional elections. 8 
Cooperation between the opposition parties was also evident in the organi-
zation of street demonstrations, business and paramilitary groups and the 
intensification of propaganda and political indoctrination by the conser-
vative media. 9 As Petras noted, "All the Right's organizational efforts, 
political and military, were directed toward mass mobilization to create 
the basis for a change in government or at least in program. 1110 The 
mounting offensive by the Right reached its high point in October 1972, 
with what became known as the "Bosses Strike". The situation and condi-
tions surrounding this strike will be discussed in detail later, however, 
at this point I am going to discuss why, post-April 1971, the class struggle 
intensified and also examine the U.P.'s response to this intensification. 
37 
The Allende government, during its first months in power, had 
been able to stimulate the economy in the short run by a number of popu-
list measures. Pedro Vuskovic was Allende's Minister of Economic Affairs, 
and his program had three main objectives: (1) To restructure the Chilean 
economy into three spheres of ownership; a socially-owned property sector, 
one of joint ownership and a private property sector; (2) To achieve a 
rapid and substantial growth in the wage earne~'s share of national income; 
(3) These above changes will form the basis of a new development model 
from which the "socialist transformation of the Chilean economy is begun. 1111 
However, these were largely based on using up unused industrial capacity 
and correcting inefficiencies and corruption. In addition, they were 
carried out at a time when the Right was disoriented and disunified. By 
the fall of 1971 this excess capacity had been exhausted and unemployment 
was low. The only way the U.P. could have increased production rapidly 
would have been by the expansion of the state sector, coupled with the 
implementation of a more rationalized plan of production. The uplift in 
the economy, then, had come to a standstill and its expansion was not 
possible due partly to sabotage by the Right and U.S. covert intervention. 
As Kyle Steenland pointed out " ••. the Chilean bourgeoisie ••• " by use of 
" ... its Congressional majority and its control of the majority of the 
media (65 percent of the newspapers printed, for example, support the 
Right) was able to block theexpansion of the state sector. 1112 Also, in 
June 1972, Vuskovic was replaced by Orlando Millas, a Communist who fol-
lowed a policy of limit:ing the size of the social-property area in order 
to placate the middle sectors and the Christian Democrats. This showed 
All d I • • 1 f • l' 13 en es increasing y re ormist ine. 
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Actions by the U.S. and a number of its corporations played a 
large part in bringing about worsening economic conditions. The question 
of intervention in Chilean affairs by the U.S. government and U.S. corpora-
tions will be examined in detail in a later chapter. At this juncture I 
intend only to discuss it briefly as it related to the increasing economic 
sabotage and class polarization. 
Having failed to prevent the election .m,d confirmation of Allende 
as President, the White House and the National Security Council "settled 
on an overall strategy of controlled escalation of hostile measures in 
which periods of conflict would alternate with periods of negotiatJon. 1114 
Its main objective seemed to be to try to instigate situations (such as 
the October strike), which would bring about economic dislocation. With 
the benefit of hindsight, Petras speculated that there were three parts 
to the U.S. plan for economic dislocation: (1) an international credit 
squeeze, (2) the elaboration of an ideology of "lack of credit-worthiness" 
based on poor economic conditions. (Conditions which the U.S., in large 
part, had manufactured themselves by the credit blockade), (3) the identi-
fication of gradual economic deterioration with internal government policy, 
thus creating the economic basis for polarizing Chilean society in a 
manner favorable to the groups of owners of large properties.15 
The U.S., through the World Bank, Export-Import Bank, and the IMF, 
denied new credits to Chile. The latter institution, also on government 
orders, hindered the renegotiation of Chile's foreign debt in the Paris 
talks of early 1972. Pressures such as these, in addition to the drop in 
world copper prices, cost Chile dearly in foreign exchange. The Chilean 
economy has a historic dependence on copper and hence when its price 
----------------------~ --- -----
dropped this had serious consequences for the economy. In 1969 copper 
sold for 66.56 cents a pound, but by 1972 it fetched only 48.20 cents. 
Chilean authorities estimated that for every cent decline in the price 
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of copper, they lost $15 million each year. In addition, American com-
panies such as Anaconda and Kennecott were partially successful in 
blocking Chilean copper sales to Europe. 16 This was especially damaging 
as Chile's economy was (and is) closely tied ~o the American market and 
the dollar. Goods became scarce, especially food and machine parts, as 
fewer dollars could now be spent on imports. Yet, as a result of Allende's 
social measures, demands for goods had increased, and this, tied to the 
printing of large amounts of new money, caused inflation to rise to 
incredible new levels. By December 1972 inflation was running at 164 per-
cent. The U.S. did not limit itself to the use of credit squeezes, but it 
also strengthened its contacts with the Chilean armed forces by increasingly 
offering them opportunities to buy armaments and vehicles. Following the 
compromise solution to the October strike, bilateral talks were proposed 
by the U.S., and they did take place. However, this seemed as though it 
was nothing more than the "negotiation phase" of the U.S. strategy. It 
can be argued that meaningful negotiations never took place, nor were they 
intended to (by the U.S.). The American government used the talks to gain 
first-hand knowledge of the mood of the Chileans and their feelings toward 
the U.S. 
Polarization, then, apart from being the natural concomitant of 
the class struggle, increased in intensity due to the economic disruption 
brought about by the U.S. and the Chilean bourgeoisi,e. 'As _a reaction -to 
the above, small businessmen and lower middle-class elements who once 
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supported Allende, now went over to the side of the opposition. The 
working classes showed great tolerance of the situation, though some of 
them became demoralized by Allende's indecisiveness and fell prey to 
rightist propaganda. The class struggle was going on all around him 
and yet it seemed that Allende could not grasp the solid logic of the 
situation that was being played out with every passing day. His failure 
to do so was to be a fatal one. Pablo Lira hati this to say about Allende's 
vacillations. 
" ... in Chile in 1972 as in other historical 
experiences, political weakness in the face 
of the middle classes' political representa-
tives, was not only no help in cementing a 
class alliance, but actually drove the middle 
sectors toward those classes or class factions 
that showed greater political strength. 11 17 
The increasing polarization and severe economic problems eventu-
ally exploded openly in the October 1972 strike. It is my contention that 
the situation brought about by the strike gave Allende the opportunity to 
move ahead again with mass mobilization and the chance to begin building 
towards a socialist society. His last opportunity had been in April 1971, 
and he had failed to take it. In October 1972, even though the conditions 
were much more difficult, if he had acted swiftly and decisively, then 
there was a chance of success. In fact, the course he did take reinforced 
the reformist and capitulatory nature of the U.P. leadership. 
In the second week of October the crisis began when a nationwide 
truck strike caused serious shortages of gasoline and flour. This resulted 
in a declaration of martial law by the Allende government in a number of 
provinces. The truckers' strike was precipitated by the government's 
refusal to meet the demands of the Confederation of Truck Owners for higher 
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cargo rates. Allende attempted to stop the strike by arresting the presi-
dent of the Confederation, Leon Vilarin, and 160 owners and drivers. Two 
days later on October 12, the small businessmen, retailers, builders and 
large farmer associations came out on strike in sympathy with the truckers. 
The momentum of the situation continued to increase as civil servants, 
ba>nk employees and some high school and university students also came out 
on strike. These were quickly followed by do 4 tors, dentists, and lawyers. 
Without doubt this was a politically motivated strike against the Allende 
government by the rightist elements in Chile. O'Brien saw the objective 
of the strike as being "to make the existing shortages acute by preventing 
the flow of food and fuel to consumers and paralyzing production and trade. 
This economic offensive, together with the activities of terrorist groups, 
was intended to create a climate of chaos and lead to the kinds of clashes 
that would provoke workers into a violent reaction, thus inviting the 
intervention of the armed forces and the overthrow of the gove~nment. 1118 
However, this did not seem to have been the avowed intention of the Chris-
tian Democrats who had strongly supported the strike. 19 Jaime Castillo, 
a political analyst for the Christian Democratic Party, maintained that 
the aim of the strike was not "to overthrow Allende, or make him renounce 
his program, but to put him back in his place, within the Constitution and 
using only laws to carry out his program. 1120 At this·point in time, then, 
the P.D.C. were the guiding force of the Right, and Frei the master coor-
dinator. David F. Belnap saw him as "a behind the scenes compromiser ... 
an elder statesman" with an " ... ambition to lead a united opposition."21 
This again demonstrated clearly the machinations of the opposition in 
that if they could not bring him down immediately, they certainly could 
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bend the rules in their favor again, while waiting and planning for the 
eventuaL~overthrow.·, 
There were two main reasons why the strike did not precipitate a 
coup; the actions of the workers and the armed forces. The armed forces 
cooperated to a certain extent in organizing, with the workers, the trans-
portation and distribution of fuel, and hence, showed they had a certain 
formal loyalty to the government. As yet, th~ armed forces were not com-
pletely decided about their future stance, in relation to the carrying 
out of a coup d'etat, and hence the plotting of the "ultraright" elements 
of the Rightist alliance did not reach fruitition in the October strike. 
One of the main reasons for the behavior of the armed forces and 
the failure of the bourgeoisie to realize their strike objectives was the 
clearly demonstrated power of the workers during the strike period. Indus-
tries were taken over and kept running by the workers and distribution 
organizations were set up. In each cordon (industrial sector) a coilllllittee 
representing the workers of all the factories was formed. Its role was to 
order the seizure of any factory closed by its owners, name a new manage-
ment team, and resume production and distribution. Simultaneously, organ-
izations were established to mobilize and train the members of the coilllllunity 
in maintaining order and defending the factories. In the housing areas and 
slums, residents were organized into "commandos comunales" (coilllllunity com-
mands). These incorporated such previously existing units as, industrial 
unions, health boards, neighborhood committees, student and farmer-worker 
organizations (the latter in semi-rural areas). The prime role of the com-
andos was the distribution of food and other supplies, political education, 
and the creation of self-defense forces. The spontaneity of the workers in 
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the organization of these bodies, however, should not be overestimated. 
O'Brien saw the situation as one in which "Almost spontaneously workers 
came together at local and regional levels, unified their organizations 
22 
and resolved the concrete problems caused by the strike." A more real-
istic assessment of the situation was one of crediting the MIR with an 
initiating role. As McEoin maintained, "MIR played a principal part in 
the organization of the response to the Octob~r lock-outs. 11 23 This was 
certainly true because up until this point the workers had always chan-
nelled their struggles through the CUT and the unions. However, the 
workers' movements were not tightly controlled by the MIR and the workers 
did not regard themselves as being under MIR's control or restricted to 
their guidelines. 
In my opinion there were a number of important lessons for Allende 
to learn from the steadily increasing polarization period, post-April 1971, 
and in particular from the October crisis. However, Allende refused to 
accept the dynamics of the situation and the possibilities that evolved 
from the workers' mobilization. So reformism and compromise continued. 
Allende ended the strike by following the path of compromise, as strongly 
advocated by the C.P. He accepted the resignation of the whole cabinet 
and appointed military men to head three key ministries: the Interior, 
Mining, and Public Works. Two workers' representatives were also brought 
into the cabinet: Luis Figueiou, as Minister of Works and Rolando Calderon, 
as Minister of Agriculture. However, this was more of a token sop to the 
Left as it was very clear that the military representatives held the power-
ful positions. 24 
In terms of the struggle for socialism, Allende's handling of the 
October 1972 strike showed again clearly the reformist and conciliatory 
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nature of the U.P. leadership, and its lack of long-term insight. As I 
have tried to show throughout this paper, Chilean society had become 
increasingly polarized, and Allende showed his weakness by not responding 
decisively to this. Morris pointed out one of the consequences of follow-
ing such a path " .•• the government would continue speaking the rhetoric 
of socialism, yet would become increasingly conservative, leading the 
masses astray and providing no leadership at ohe critical moments of 
Chilean history. 1125 Not only this, but by his vacillations, Allende 
lost much of his earlier middle class support (as discussed earlier). 
Fidel Castro, when he visited Chile, summed up the situation, "You're 
going through that period in the process in which the fascists--to call 
them by their right name--are trying to beat you out of the middle strata 
of the population. There is a specific moment in every revolutionary pro-
cess when fascists and revolutionaries engage in a struggle for the sup-
port of the middle strata. 1126 By his weakness Allende lost this struggle. 
Decisive action by Allende could have resulted in the polarization of the 
middle class to the left, however, the reverse was the case, and they polar-
ized to the right. 
Allende's reformism seemed to have propelled him on the road of 
short-run compromises, which would stall any attempted coup d'etat while 
waiting for the March 1973 Congressional elections~- If this was ever an 
alternative, it had by post-Ocotober 1972 lost much of its viability. In 
order for Allende to have fundamentally changed the present balance of power, 
he would have needed to have secured more than 50 percent of the vote, ,ior 
alternativel;y. get lei:;s than 33. 3_ percen~ of tlie. vot~ •.. Given the po_liti,:a~ 
strat_egies _,q( _b9.th the major _pe>),itic;{ll forces at the time>_ neither result 
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seemed likely. As we know, neither of Lhe above results were accomp-
lished.27 The U.P. made some significant gains, however, Allende must 
have been naive to think that an increase in their vote in March would 
help halt the polarization process and end violence and disruption. The 
Right was already geared to overthrow Allende when the conditions became 
favorable. Adherence to the constitution was only viable when it suited 
their strategy, and Allende should have realiz~d this and begun his own 
mobilizations immediately to defend himself and the workers. I am not 
suggesting that Allende should not have participated in the elections, 
but what I am suggesting is that to base his whole political strategy 
around it, was a mistaken analysis. Political power and initiative was 
moving into the streets and Allende's plans and strategies should have 
reflected this. 
A stalemate situation came about after the elections and Allende 
was now set on playing the role of compromiser to the bourgeoisie until 
the 1976 Presidential elections. As Steenland pointed out, "This would 
mean the Allende government resting on the laurels of its most anti-
imperialist and anti-monopolist reforms, while indefinitely postponing 
the building of socialism--in other words, the strategy of the C.P. 11 28 
The reformism of the U.P. and the increasing influence of the C.P., 
then, has been clearly demonstrated. Allende solved nothing by his action 
of bringing the military into the cabinet. James Petras analyzed the situ-
ation after the Ocotber strike, "The dramatic confrontation in October 
1972 posed the question of social power in the most decisive manner; 
Allende's "compromise"--bringiilg the armed fo;rces::in~Q the.<;R~inet-:--;has_ only 
temporarily postponed the final denouemenL- -: . The economic:·p_r9bl~s Qf: E 
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the country can be dealt with only when one or the other social class is 
firmly in control of the process of production. 1129 
If socialism was ever going to be built, then the social class 
that had to gain control was the working class, and the oppor1·unity came 
again to Allende to attempt this in October 1972. Increasing political 
polarization was by this stage a fact of life, however, Allende allowed 
the balance of the class struggle to be tippe~ against him by his reform-
ist policies. 
The working class and peasants had fought a strong defensive battle 
against the opposition's economi.c sabotage attempts which culminated in 
the 1972 strike. Factories were occupied, production was continued and 
the distribution of goods was carried out--all by the mobilization of the 
workers. "Punta Final" realized the significance of this 1 " ••• the work-
ing class has successfully invaded various prerogatives of the state. It 
has shown that it is perfectly capable, not only of excluding the bour-
geoisie from the economic life of the country but of taking the state 
into its own hands. That is the great lesson of the crisis. 1130 
Here, then, were popular organizations of "dual" or "counterpower" 
h . h h d . t h R" h ' ff · 31 w 1c a grown up 1n response o t e ig ts o ensive. The very 
growth of these o,rganizations and the role they played showed the increas-
ing class consciousness of the workers and a self-realization of their 
part in the revolutionary process. The strengthening and development of 
these workers' organizations could have been the beginnings of a move 
towards the building of socialism. In addition, the workers' organiza-
tions should have been armed by Allende as a logical outgrowth of the 
formation of vigilante groups to protect the factories from right-wing 
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sabotage. As Evans said, " ... if there were a mass workers militia it is 
likely that soldiers and police taking the side of the people would be 
attracted to it. 1132 
Without doubt the obstacles to constructing socialism at this 
point were much greater than in April 1971, however, the condition of the 
class struggle, if it was to be won by the workers, demanded such action. 
The Right was plainly intensifying its offensfve strategy, and hence 
Allende should have responded in kind. As mentioned previously, the 
workers' organizations should have been strengthened, developed and a 
popular militia formed. Potential new institutions of dual power should 
have been created in addition to the ones thrown up by the October strike, 
and an aggressive policy of mobilizing the masses should have been under-
taken. Due to the U.P.'s continued failure to mobilize the masses and the 
MIR's failure to provide adequate leadership, there still remained in Chile, 
large sectors of the masses which had not yet been mobilized. Only one-
third of the proletariat was organized in unions, and also the shantytown 
and community dwellers (the poorest strata of Chilean society), had not 
been organized to their fullest potential. "In the Popular Unity view they 
remained passive agents .... Thus the tendency for Allende's government to 
1 f d 11 h 1 . . 1 d . . d · · d ,, 33 re y un amenta yon t e pro etar1at 1n arge ynam1c .1n ustr1es continue. 
As Steenland claimed, "There are more than enough popular forces to mobilize, 
once these disinherited and exploited groups are convinced that they are 
struggling for real social and political power and not just the replacement 
of a few Congressmen, by a few others. 1134 
The need to move away from the C.P. line to that of the revolution-
ary left, should have been seen as a necessity by Allende, even though there 
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was a fear of provoking a military coup. However, if Allende had followed 
the teachings of his own avowed Marxism, he would have realized that the 
class struggle would sooner or later, have produced a violent confronta-
tion. Hence, a move toward the line of the revolutionary left and mass 
mobilization should have been the most logical alternative to take in 
that at this stage of the polarization process, the impending inevitability 
of confrontation should have been realized ana prepared for. Admittedly, 
the above alternative would have required an end to inter-party sectarian-
ism within the U.P., and a closer cooperation between the MIR and the U.P. 
Again, th:is would have required strong, decisive action by Allende to 
struggle against the difficulties involved in such a move. But as we know 
what happened was the continuation of the "timid and permissive policies 
of the Allende-Communist Party leadership toward the bourgeoisie."35 
The populist reformism of Allende's first six months, then, evolved 
into weak, ever-rightward moving policies which increasingly ignored the 
aspirations and mobilizations of the masses. As political polarization 
intensified, the compromising of Allende and the U.P. leadership, pushed 
it into a vulnerable "centre" position in the ensuing class struggle. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FINAL OVERTHROW 
Hypothesis: Allende misunderstood the intensifying nature of the class 
struggle, and as a result of this, became incr~asingly reliant on the 
armed forces and hence helped bring about his own downfall and that of 
the working class. 
I have already discussed some .Of the implications of the March 
1973 e.lections in the previous chapter, however, the concept of its 
position as a "watershed" in the class struggle merits further discussion. 
Without doubt the Right had been increasing its offensive against the 
government prior to the March elections, but even at that time sections 
of the Right such as the P.n.C. were still considering legalistic means 
of eventually defeating Allende. It was clear that the Right was stunned 
and dismayed by the election results. To reiterate on the results briefly, 
Allende won 44 percent of the vote in March 1973, compared with the 36.3 
percent that elected him in September 1970. As Zimblast and Stallings 
pointed out, "This made Allende the first Chilean president since the 
Second World War to increase his election support after two and a half 
years in office. 111 This achievement was all the more significant as it 
happened within an environment of dire economic and social difficulties. 
The message, as interpreted by the Right, seemed to be then that even in 
the face of some of the worst social and economic conditions to face the 
country in modern history, the government's strategy of shifting the 
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pattern of rewards and punishments had payed off, politically. 2 The 
leaders in the U.P. government saw the results as a sign of electoral 
support for their reformist policies and the strategy of the peaceful 
road. Allende failed to realize, however, that the class struggle had 
reached such a point that the electoral mandate he received was no 
longer viable for his proposed course of action. In fact, the election 
results by their very nature precluded "the pe!lceful road" to socialism. 
Parts of the bourgeoisie, who earlier had entertained ideas of a 
legalistic solution (as advocated by the P.D.C.), now saw the support of 
the Left growing and prospects of increased U.P. activity in the imple-
mentation of their program. This left the way open for the most reaction-
ary element of the Right to increase its dominance of the bourgeoisie. 
The Right was also inclined to move more wholelistically towards extra-
constitutional maneuvers due to the fact that in its opinion, " ... the 
government was no longer in control of the revolutionary process and 
however much it might be prepared to surrender, the masses would not 
accept any deals. 113 The idea of serious negotiation and compromise with 
the government was then eventually discarded by the Right. 
In this particular instance, the analysis of the situation by the 
opposition had been more accurate than that of Allende's. By giving the 
U.P. 44 percent of the vote the workers were not necessarily endorsing 
Allende's policies, but trying to ensure the posit:ion of the U.P. whose 
existence was an absolute necessity for the prospect of any revolutionary 
advance. Although the U.P. was not a revolutionary government, without 
it, the implementat:ion of socialism would have little or no chance. The 
Right was already aware of what the masses were saying, and they realized 
that they (the masses) had the potential to realize their aims. 
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Lawrence saw the March 1973 election results as being almost the 
single factor which caused the intervention by the military and Allende's 
overthrow. He maintained that, " ... intervention came about because of 
the success rather than the failures of the Allende government •••. The out-
come of the congressional elections of March 1973 were crucial to the fall 
of the Allende regime. 114 To a certain extent the election was a "water-
shed" in the political polarization proeess, but it did not in itself 
bring about the military coup. The class struggle had been going on now 
for two and a half years, and its own dialectic would sooner or later 
have caused one side or the other to take control. The election, then, 
was just one part of this class struggle, and although it did intensify 
the confrontation, and increase the influence of the reactionary ele-
ments, its importance must not be over-exaggerated. Lawrence's theory 
that it was Allende's successes rather than failures which caused his 
downfall is also an interesting one, although it is very subjective and 
incomplete. I would maintain that it is just as valid to argue that it 
was Allende's continued failure to mobilize the masses and move towards 
a revolutionary situation that was the cause of his downfall. 
The effect of the :March election results are then open to differ-
ing interpretations, however, without doubt it reflected the ever-intensi-
fying polarization process. 
Not only did the U.P. expand its base of support, but the right-
wing National Party won an additional three seats in the Senate and a sub-
stantial number in the Chamber, partly at the expense of their ally, the 
ChristianDemocrats. This was interesting as the National Party had con-
sistently campaigned on the platform that they wanted " ... Allende's head, 
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and the elimination of the Communist Party. 115 The Christian Democrats, 
on the other hand, in their campaign., had claimed that they didn't want 
to overthrow Allende, but only hoped that he would rectify his errors. 
The increasing polarization process was also noted by Jonathan Kandell 
in the March 6, New York Times. "Splinter parties on both sides lost 
heavily as Chileans cast their votes for the big parties in the two 
electoral alliances, the Christian Democrats aud Nationals, and the 
Socialists and Communists. 116 The political forces in Chile ,:_then, were 
allying themselves into two opposing camps. 
The period from the March 4 elections to the eventual coup d'etat 
was characterized by an escalation of the Rightist offensive. It is my 
contention that because of Allende's indecisiveness and failure to move 
to the left, he became more reliant on the military and eventually placed 
himself in an untenable position from which there was no escape. At this 
point, though, Allende's and the military's actions need to be put in the 
context of the overall intensification of the Rightist offensive. 
On March 27 Allende announced a new all-civilian cabinet after 
accepting the resignation of the three generals, a move by the generals 
which on the surface seemed to be at odds with the increasing political 
polarization and the role of the military. Some saw the resignations as 
a concession to the Left, however, it could and was also viewed as a 
tactical maneuver. The Right saw the situation as one in which a violent 
overthrow of the government was going to be necessary and hence, for the 
generals to remain in the cabinet would have served little purpose, and 
would, in fact, have restrained their movements. Not only this, but the 
resignations were intended to allay the growing fears (especially among 
the "ultra-left") of a coup, whereas in reality the battle lines for 
Allende's overthrow were more clearly being drawn. 
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The Right continued to undermine the economy in a number of ways. 
In Congress the P.N. and P.D.C. joined together to drastically reduce the 
government's budget, and this consequently left many social programs and 
the state r,ector of the economy underfinanced. The r,nly way the U .P. 
could pay for these (within the legalistic framework in which they worked), 
was by deficit spending, a measure which further aggravated Chile's infla-
tion rate. The U.P. also presented a bill wh:i..ch made it a civil crime to 
hoard or engage in black market activities and economic sabotage; the P.N. 
and P.D.C., though, combined to defeat it. 7 The opposition also intro-
duced constitutional amendments which attempted to dismantle much of the 
Social Area, and reverse the agrarian reform. 8 
These Congressional maneu·,;-ers were supplemented by increased agi-
tation and calls for civil disobedience. In the October owners' strike, 
the bourgeoisie had failed to achieve its objectives because the working 
class had not supported them, but in actual fact had actively opposed 
them. Cons,!quently, the Right realized the value of causing intra-class 
conflict among the workers in an attempt to divide the working class and 
lessen its pow,::•.r. In April 1973 the Right took the opportunity to carry 
out such a maneuver. 
Due to a misunderstanding between the U.P. and. the El Teniente 
miners there was some confusion caused concerning wage increases to cover 
the cost of inflation. The miners became convinced that they were entitled 
to more than they received, though their expectations would have put them-
selves in a privileged position vis-a-vis the rest of the working class. 
No small part of this convincing came as a result of Right-wing organiza-
tion at the mines and eventually the miners were convinced to go on strike. 9 
The strike did not in any real terms achieve the object of dividing the 
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working class as the other large copper mines refused P.D.C. entreaties 
to stage a sympathy strike. The strike finally ended after the abortive 
coup on June 29. However, the strike wreaked havoc with Chile's already 
weakened economy, and it also demonstrated Allende's weakness and poor 
grasp of the situation.lo 
Allende's distance from the masses, and his weakness allowed a 
situation to develop in which the Right was ab].e to organize and provoke 
a strike which caused great confusion among U.P. supporters. A New York 
Times editorial set the picture. "It was Marxist managers not Yankee 
oppressors who fired men for striking and brought strikebreakers to El 
Teniente. And it was a Marxist-led government that ordered police to use 
tear gas and water cannon to break up a march on Santiago by 4,000 miners 
1111 
The masses, then, were treated to a scenario in which the bour-
geoisie supported the demands of the working class, while the U.P. called 
the workers' demands "fascist. 1112 This paradoxical situation caused great 
confusion among the masses and Allende must be blamed for not involving 
himself with the miners and exposing the role played by the Right in this 
whole affair. Because of his failure to do so the situation "resulted in 
the Chilean proletariat suffering the most bitter episode of enemy pene-
tration into its ranks. 1113 
On the morning of June 29 an attempted military coup, which con-
sisted of a tank attack on the Presidential palace and the Ministry of 
Defense, was crushed by troops loyal to Allende. The rebel troops con-
sisted of troops from the Second Armoured Regiment, led by Colonel 
Roberto Souper. In collaboration with the Patria-y-Libertad and the 
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National Party and possibly with sectors of the P.D.C., they had hoped 
to set off a series of uprisings throughout the cotmtry. 14 The small 
number of troops who participated in the coup attempt showed that the 
military was still not completely unified behind the idea of a military 
confrontation with the Allende government. 
However, at this point the most important effect of the attempted 
coup was the working class' response to it. Allende broadcast a call to 
the workers to take over their factories and, if necessary, to come into 
the streets to defend the government. The C.U.T. (Central Labor Confed-
eration) reinforced this call. C.U.T. was the main trade union organiza-
tion in Chile, however, less than 30 percent of the working class were 
unionized. Traditionally though, working class demands had been channeled 
through C.U.T., and in 1969 it had been C.U.T. 's influence which had 
mobilized the workers against Roberto Viaun's attempted coup d'etat in 
October 1969. 15 However, the low amount of people actually unionized in 
C.U.T. reflected the fact that there were many people who were excluded 
from popular power. Consequently, as the class struggle intensified, 
the workers took it upon themselves to mobilize and organize their own 
power bodies. Although the C.U.T. was involved in the building of the 
"cordones" the process was not under their control. The workers, then, 
had passed by_ the_ fohna:L trade cunioii organizatd'on;~ The C~ U .. L ·tried~ to 
insist that all mobilization efforts should be coordinated by them, but 
they were not successful in this. If anything, the C.U.T. was a brake 
on the revolutionary mobilizations of the workers by attempting to make 
them subordinate to their more moderate guidelines. 
The response of the working class was again impressive as it was 
in October of 1972, and it increasingly sho-,,ed their militancy. The 
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"cordones" were quickly revitalized, and over 350 factories and several 
hundred farms were taken over. Trucks and buses were also requisitioned 
in order that transport facilities would be ensured. In addition, an 
important aspect of the workers' mobilizations occurred: "the strength-
ening and partial arming of their defense committees. 1116 Also, rumors 
of further military conspiracies were rife and consequently new cordones 
were forliled and long-term preparations were ma«e, such as the organiza-
tion of medical and food supplies and firearms training. 
The working class, then, had taken control of many sections of 
industry and was more united and highly mobilized than ever before. They 
saw their actions as a defense of the gains made by the working class 
against yet another assault from the Right. A revolutionary situation, 
then, was potentially in the making and even though this particular coup 
attempt had failed, the workers " ... remained on the offensive awaiting a 
revolutionary lead for the next stage in the struggle. 1117 
However, Allende did not provide this lead; but by nis compromising 
and seeming naivety concerning the class struggle, attempted immediately 
to "stabilize" the situation. The U.P. brought pressure to bear on C.U.T •. 
to organize the return of the factories that had been taken over. This 
was not completely successful as many workers absolutely refused to turn 
them over. Allende then turned to the armed forces to ask them to 
"restore law and order," and a decision was also made to recollect arms 
that had been distributed to the workers. Finally, Allende called for 
compromise talks with the Christian Democrats. 
These actions by Allende were another clear example of his 
inherent reformism and lack of ability to take decisive actinn. This 
type of vacillation and inde-ci'si·veness has characterized many of Allende's 
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actions, maybe because he never really had a definite strategy or master 
plan. Allende himself said, "The revolutionary struggle may be a guer-
illa campaign, a people's war, an insurrection, or a general election, 
depending on its specific content. 11 18 However, at this point in time 
there was no real choice left even if Allende could have made one. The 
polarization process had reached a stage where confrontation was becoming 
inevitable. The masses had already chosen the.path of a "people's war~" 
but Allende was still dithering. As the masses became more unified, 
militant and ready for a move towards revolution, Allende moved nearer 
and nearer to compromise solutions with the armed forces and the bour-
geoisie. The opportunity had again presented itself to Allende to uti-
lize the mass support he had, but again he failed to do so. Not only 
that but these attempts to give back the factories and recollect arms 
was a demoralizing blow to the workers who had so instantly rallied forth 
to his defense on June 29--many of them unarmed or carrying only sticks 
and clubs. 
Allende's refusal to give any real power to the workers left him 
with only the military as a means to defend the government in the face 
of the ongoing terrorist activities of the Right and the "gremios strike" 
of July 26. The truck owners announced an indefinite .strike and other 
"gremios" (owners unions) came out on strike to support the truckers. 
Commerce was halted for several days and industries were forced to 
operate at below optimal capacity. The opposition failed to close the 
industries completely because the workers, as they had done in the pre-
vious bosses strike, activated the cordones and comunal commands to pre-
serve some level of production and distribution. 
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Allende's response was again reformist and of a compromise nature; 
he reopened talks with the Christian D1::>mocrats, again shunning the mobili-
zations organized by the workers. The P.D.C. insisted on the re-entry 
of the military into the cabinet and on August 10 Allende complied, and 
heads of the military assumed important cabinet posts. 19 
The theme I have been trying to illustrate and analyze, then, is 
one of continued reliance on the military in r~sponse to an intensified 
Rightist offensive, even though the workers increasingly demonstrated 
their power and readiness to support the government {llld move towards a 
revolutionary situation. Allende was mistaken in his policy towards the 
armed forces and he eventually placed himself in a position from which 
they were able to overthrow him. As Sandri pointed out, "The fact was 
that the positioning of the forces in the arena of the class struggle had 
cut down his room to maneuver. 1120 
The armed forces had a "tradition" of respecting the constitution 
and being the guardians of the legal government; a tradition which Allende 
continually attempted to maintain. However, history does not completely 
vindicate this tradition, as Alain Joxe pointed out, "Historically they 
(the armed forces) have always intervened at political conjunctures that 
were critical for capitalism and imperialism as they did in 1891 to bring 
an end to President Balmaceda's brief attempt at economic nationalism and 
almost continuously during the prolonged period of crisis from 1920-33. 1121 
It was not so much that Allende was completely naive concerning the hist-
orical role of the armed forces. Obviously not, as he spent a lot of 
energy attempting to appease them. However, he was naive in seeing the 
military as neutral territory which could be won over by the working class. 
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The military as a whole should have been viewed as an inherent part of 
the bourgeois .state structure and as an active participant in that struc-
ture when it felt that the status quo was being overly threatened. This 
is not to say that propaganda techniques, as utilized by parts of the 
Left, to S.Plit the armed forces was an incorrect policy. On the contrary, 
such a policy, as partially attempted by the MIR, was the only realistic 
one. By succeeding in causing the disaffectio~ of parts of the rank and 
file, the strength of the military itself could have been weakened, and 
a more effective popular militia could have been formed. However, the 
MIR did not have the ability to carry out such a policy in any concen-
trated way. The U.P. refrained from doing so, because of a fear of pro-
voking a military backlash, and hence their policy revolved around appeal-
ing to the armed forces "constitutionalist" nature. 
As I mentioned previously, Allende's attempts to keep the military 
/ 
neutral or win them over to his side and his failure to respond to the 
masses leftward movements, resulted in a situation where the military 
became more and more involved in the class struggle. During the time of 
the U.P. government, the armed forces were called in by the U.P. on a 
number of occasions to act as arbiters in the ensuing class struggle. 
However, as the military became more and more solidified behind the 
Rightist point of view, their actions as arbiters became increasingly 
repressive against the Left. After periodically being invited by the 
U.P. to play the role of arbiter, it was not surprising that the military 
themselves were to take it upon themselves to play the role of final 
arbiter. 
Allende first called upon the military on the occasion of the 
"March of the Empty Pots" in December 1971. 22 This was a march organized 
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by the Right in an attempt to spark off confrontation and elicit a reac-
tionary response from the armed forces. However, when violence did 
break out between members of the Partia-y-Libertad party (who formed a 
"guard of honor" for the march), and construction workers, the armed 
forces moved in to support the workers and hence Allende. Many wealthy 
young men were arrested and a State of Emergency was declared in Santiago 
in which soldiers enforced a curfew in the city's wealthiest suburbs. In 
March 1972 the armed forces again moved to support the government. They 
raided the headquarters of the Fatherland and Freedom group and requisi-
tioned a large cache of arms which were reportedly going to be used in 
a forthcoming "March for Freedom," organized by the opposition. 23 
Incidents such as these in the earlier days of the U.P. govern-
ment tended to reinforce Allende's view that the armed forces would remain 
1 b b h . d f h k" 1 24 neutra or may e even e won over tote s1 e o t e wor 1ng c ass. In 
an attempt to do just that Allende consistently praised the military and 
ensured that officers' salaries and supplies were not unduly eroded by 
inflation. It was almost an attempt to isolate the armed forces from the 
class struggle, however, it was an attempt that became increasingly unsuc-
cessful. 
It is not my purpose to list a chronology of military events 
which were aimed at repressing the Left. This would be far to simplistic 
a route as it would also be possible to list a number of events which 
could be interpreted as being supportive of Allende. However, I will try 
to point out and analyze a few situations which illustrate the danger 
involved in the reliance that Allende had on the military. 
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Another "March for Freedom" was called for by the Right, this 
time in Concepcion, and again it seemed with the intention of causing 
large-scale violence. A counter-march was organized by the Left, but 
permission to hold it was refused. However, in actual fact, both marches 
took place and the police were brouiht in to prevent a clash. The tactic 
employed by the police to prevent a clash was to attack the Left-wing 
March. One person was killed and forty injured. 25 
• 
The police also frequently harrassed poblaciones. For example, 
in Lo Hermida a man was killed and many wer,e injured and arrested when 
the police came looking for an "ultra-leftist who was being hidden in 
the poblacion. 
The fact that the June 29 attempted coup was only supported by 
a few sections of the military showed that complete polarization had not 
yet taken place. However, without doubt "a change in the attitude of the 
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armed forces was becoming steadily more obvious." This was again shown 
by the military's !?terpretation of the new law which gave them power to 
search for illegally ·held arms. They used it almost exclusively against 
the workers while ignoring the paramilitary forces of the Right. 
Slowly, then, the military moved away from Allende's control and 
became polarized to the Right. The military, in spite of Allende's 
efforts to the contrary, began to be effected by inflation and black mar-
ket prices. In addition they saw themselves as part of the middle class 
whose position in society was being threatened.by Allende. The revolu-
tionary Left's analysis of the armed forces had proved to be more accurate 
than Allende's. They (the armed forces) were acting out the role expected 
of them in the State structure, namely, the protection of the domination 
of the ruling class when it became threatened. 
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The truck owners strike was still continuing and it was clear 
that its aim was to bring down the government. The military, though, 
were clearly unwilling to move against the truck owners. The new 
Minister of Transport, General Ruiz Danyau, advocated that the govern-
ment give in to them, and he refused to take any further action against 
them. Obviously Allende had to respond to this and he forced Danyau to 
resign from the Cabinet and the air force. Th:is caused loud rumbling$" 
of discontent among the armed forces. Allende felt threatened enough by 
this to fire Faivovich, who was Undersecretary of Transport, and who had 
advocated that the workers take over the owners' trucks. 27 Even at this 
advanced stage of the polarization process, Allende was still making 
desperate efforts to ward off the inevitable clash. Efforts which were 
a totally inadequate response to the Right's overtly confrontationist 
maneuvers. Allende should have realized that the bourgeoisie could no 
longer be stalled with compromises and cabinet reshuffles. 
Shortly after this General Prats resigned in order, as he put it, 
"to preserve the unity of the armed forces," and Admiral Montero did like-
wise.28 The military, then, were closing their ranks against the U.P. 
government. The military coup of September 11, 1973 must be seen in the 
context of the right-wing offensive which had been growing in intensity 
in the preceding months. The military, by purging "constitutionalist" 
soldiers, t'error'izing the workers, and withdrawing their support from 
Allende, were testing the strength of the opposition, while at the same 
time cautiously moving into a position to stage a coup. However, Allende 
accepted all this "in the name of compromise, security and reconciliation. 112 9 
Allende had a preoccupation with constitutional strategy, legality and 
reformism. This prevented him from seeing that by his reliance on the 
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military and by his attempts to compromise with them, he was, in fact, 
strengthening the very force which was to overthrow him. The Right was 
no longer interested in compromise solutions; the polarization process 
had reached its zenith, and consequently, on September 11, 1973, the 
Presidential palace was attacked and Allende killed. The military junta, 
headed by General Pinochet, which was formed just prior to the coup, 
moved swiftly to take over lines of communication..;,industries::and attatk'', 
and crush the workers. 30 Owing to Allende's refusal to mobilize and arm 
the workers, most of them were unarmed and easily crushed by the military. 
However, some industries had been able to obtain some weapons, but they 
were eventually defeated by the superior organization and firepower of 
the armed forces. 
Throughout the last six months of the U.P. government the Right 
had been moving closer and closer to a coup d'etat position. They were 
in the process of mobilizing and organizing the final confrontation. Yet 
Allende did not respond in kind, even thocgh the workers clearly showed 
they were ready to move towards a revolutionary situation. It seemed as 
though the more intense became the Rightist offensive--the more desperate 
became Allende's attempts at compromise. By doing so he ignored his only 
base of support, the workers, and in addition, increasingly left them 
open to right-wing terro1·ism. By failing to mobilize and arm the workers, 
Allende became reliant on the armed forces for support politically, and 
on the streets. As a result of this the RightJ as a whole, was able to 
strengthen its position while the working class became more isolated from 
Allende and increasingly vulnerable. 
Given the above balance of forces, the military were able to take 
over and crush the workers, and Allende's heroic stand in the Presidential 
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palace could not change the fact that his analysis of the class struggle 
had been tragically mistaken. 
As Monthly Review Press pointed out, " ••. the time had come for a 
definitive answer and it came from the Right. 1131 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN CHILE 
Hypothesis: The U.S. was directly and indirectly involved in the build-
up to the coup in Chile, and although it was ~ot solely responsible for 
the overthrow, its role must in no way be underestimated. 
With the 1970 election victory of Allende, "U.S. policy-makers 
and CIA and private corporate officials were thrown into disarray ..• " 1 
Although ITT officials had kept a close watch on the build-up to the 1970 
election, their concern over a possible Allende victory had not been 
listened to very closely in Washington. 2 This was partly due to the fact 
that the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, had confidently predicted 
a victory for Jorge Alessandri, the right-wing candidate. 3 So confident 
had he and others been that no coordinated machinery __ had-_ been ;built; to deal 
with the situation that faced them in September 1970. Initially, then, in 
the period between Allende's election victory and November, frantic, con-
fused, and for the most part, uncoordinated efforts were made to block 
Allende's confirmation. Because of the confusion and lack of coordination 
it was difficult to determine who was actually initiating U.S. policy at 
this time. The ITT memo's for this period, though, provide a useful insight 
into U.S. machinations against Allende. 
As I mentioned earlier ITT had been concerned about the possibility 
of Allende winning the election, and when this became a reality, they met 
with the CIA again and tried to impress upon them the need to form a plan 
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of action to prevent Allende from being confirmed as President. ITT also 
tried to inform Kissinger that they were willing to financially contribute 
towards such a plan. This was revealed in an ITT memo in which William 
Merriam, executive representative for ITT, informed Jack Neal, inter-
national relations director, "I telephoned Mr. Kissinger's office and 
talked with Pete Vaky, who is the State Department's Latin American adviser 
to Kissinger ...• I told Mr. Vaky to tell Mr. K:iJ,singer ... that we are pre-
pared to assist financially in sums up to seven figures. 114 It was also 
claimed that the State Department gave Ambassador Korry "maximum authority 
to do all possible--short of a Dominican Republic-type action--to keep 
Allende from taking power." 5 
Without doubt the reaction of the White House to Allende's victory 
was one of shock and hostility and "the most significant challenge to U.S. 
policy since the Cuban Revolution. 116 The U.S. government's interdepart-
mental "Committee of Forty" met soon after the election to discuss the 
implications of the Chilean results and to plan countermoves. Although 
it is not known if anything was decided at that meeting, " .•. there were 
hints that the United States' line toward Chile was hardening and that 
some form of intervention was being considered. 117 This was partly 
reflected in an off-the-record briefing given on September 16, 1970 by 
Henry Kissinger. He saw Allende as " ... backed by Communists and probably 
a Communist himself ••. " who represented, "a non-democratic party, which 
tends to make his election pretty irreversible." Kissinger also viewed 
the situation as an extremely serious one. " ... I don't think we should 
delude ourselves that an Allende takeover in Chile would not present 
massive problems for us, and for democratic forces and for pro-U.S. 
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forces in Latin America, and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere .•.. 
So we are taking a close look at the situation ...• It is one of those 
situations which is not too happy for American interests. 118 Kissinger's 
views were more bluntly revealed in the New York Times. They quoted him 
as saying. "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go 
communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." 9 
On September 29 the head of the Cland~stine Services, Western 
Hemisphere Division of the CIA, William Broe, met ITT Vice President 
Edward Gerrity. The content of their meeting came to light in the testi-
mony of Broe before the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. 
There was a fear on the part of the U.S. that, " ... the Christian Democrat 
Members of Congress were showing indications of swinging their full sup-
port to Allende in the belief that they could make a political bargain 
with him ••• " However, they were not totally certain of their move to 
support Allende and hence ensure his confinnation as President because, 
"At the same time the economic situation had worsened because of the 
reaction to the Allende election and there were indications that this 
was worrying the Christian Democratic Congressmen." As Broe then further 
explained, "There was a thesis that additional deterioration in the eco-
nomic situation could influence a numbet of Chtistian Demooratic. Con-, 
. 10 gressmen who were planning to vote for Allende." 
Without doubt there was economic chaos in the weeks following 
Allende's election. Bank deposits dropped sharply as did the sale of 
goods. The inflow of capital from abroad stopped in September and the 
Santiago Stock Exchange suffered a trading decrease of 60 percent. Not 
only this but on October 22 the Commander-in-Chief of the Anny, General 
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Rene Schneider was assassinated during a kidnap attempt on him by an 
11 
extreme Right-wing group. ..These attempts to cause. panic and economic 
sabotage failed however and Allende accepted a statute of guarantees and 
hence ensured his official confirmation as President, by the Congress. 
These early, frantic attempts though failed, and now as far as 
the U.S. was concerned. .!IA more· coordinated long-range.· strategy ·for 
defeating Allende was needed.nl2 Petras and .. LaPorte sum up the stance 
• 
and attitudes held by the respective U.S. actors in the months prior to 
Allende's confirmation. "Nixon's position and the.measures, speeches 
and behavior of the lame-duck Frei administration were intended to create 
economic collapse over a protracted period of time--while the CIA and ITT 
seemed to see it as their immediate goal. The political assessment in 
Washington of the relationship of forces in Chile appears to have been 
more realistic than the CIA's. The prudent course chosen,--1.cimited··· 
to economLc pressure--was based on a long-term strategy of political and 
13 
economic attrition." 
From November 1970 onwards those U.S. companies who had interests 
in Chile and were opposed to the U.P. government, met regularly to discuss 
their strategy against Allende. President Nixon also realized the need to 
coordinate and centralize U.S. foreign policy towards Chile, and conse-. 
quently he made the Nationa] Security Council headed by Henry Kissinger, 
his main foreign policy body. The aforementioned U.S. companies kept in 
touch with, and coordinated their efforts with, the National Security 
Council. A consensus emerged, then, between Kissinger, CIA, and ITT, 
" ... by common consent the strategy consisted of maximizing external eco-
nomic pressures on the vunerable points of the Chilean economy creating 
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political conditions for a coup within a time span longer than that ori-
14 ginally envisioned by the early opponents of Allende." 
Without doubt, then, the U.S. had connnited itself to large-scale 
intervention in Chile by means of clandestine interference, and diplomatic 
• and economic pressures. This strategy of destabilization gathered momentum 
after Allende nationalized the U.S. copper companies with virtually no 
compensation. ITT also reinforced its efforts after Allende appointed an 
• 
15 
interventor to manage ITT in Chile. The subsequent actions of the U.S. 
became known as the "invisible blockade"; a strategy in which the U.S. 
refused credit and aid to the dependent Chilean economy and encouraged 
other private financial institutions to do the same in an attempt to cause 
economic chaos. This invisible blockade formed part of the U.S. govern-
ment's destabilization policy towards Chile. The other part consisted of 
"assistance and encouragement to Chilean internal opposition to Popular 
16 
Unity in order to create a mass basis for a military intervention." 
The basic components of this invisible blockade will be outlined 
here, however, it is the analysis of the effe'ct of the blockade which is 
of the most importance. 
In dealing with the period between Allende's inauguration in 
November 1970 to early 1972, Sigmund maintained that the actions of the 
U.S. government, private banks and multi-lateral lending agencies, needed 
to be analyzed in the context of "motives". A distinction was needed 
between "legitimate reasons for not making loans and credits available 
(serious doubts about Chile's likelihood or capacity for repayment) and 
illegitimate ones (economic warfare in defense of private corporations 
or in order to promote a military coup). 1117 Sigmund supported his "lack 
of cred~t-worthiness argument with the assertion that the Chilean economy 
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was in trouble by the end of 1971. Copper prices were down, food imports 
were rising rapidly and investment, especially in the private sector had 
dropped sharply. However, as Elizabeth Farnsworth pointed out, this was 
not a satisfactory explanation of why the U.S. refused new loans and 
credit to Chile. In order to determine the real motives, the situation 
must be looked at in a historical perspective, and political considera-
tions must be taken into account. 18 
The point that needs to be made clear is that Chile has always 
been a dependent economy and hence has never been particularly credit 
worthy. In the past U.S. government and U.S. private sources have had 
little hesitation in propping up the Chilean economy during the years 
that Alessandri was President (1958-64). Eleven billion dollars of aid 
was also pumped into Chile during Frei's administration (1964-70). 19 In 
total in the post-war years (until 1971), Chile received $540 million in 
"development" loans from the Agency for International Development and its 
predecessors. These loans flowed into Chile largely to bolster the econ-
omy and prevent the election of Allende in 1964 and then to facilitate 
Frei's "Revolution in Liberty. 1120 In a 1966 Senate study of foreign aid, 
Senator Ernest Gruening described the U.S. rationale behind this. "In 
Chile, A.I.D. continued budget support and balance of payments assistance 
during the 1964 election year, to prevent economic deterioration -which·:-. 
would have sparked unemployment and discontent and presumably a swing to 
the far left politically. 1121 
When the actions of th•= U.S. government, private banks, and multi-
lateral lending agencies concerning foreign aid are placed in a historical 
context, then the political nature of their maneuvers becomes all too 
clear. Whereas in 1964 the U.S. attempted to support the economy for their 
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political ends, the scenario described by Senator Gruening became com-
pletely reversed between 1970-1973. Credit support was withdrawn to try 
and cause economic deterioration, discontent with Allende and a swing to 
the right. 
The U.S. Export-Import Bank was one of the first to take a hard-
line stance towards Chile in early 1971 when it denied the Allende admini-
stration's first request for a loan, $21 millibn, to purchase three Boeing 
passenger jets. 22 At the time of the request U.S. officials admitted that 
23 Chile's "credit-worthiness" was the simplest part of the problem. This 
implied that the denial of the loan was political, a fact which was made 
all the more clearer by the fact that " ... at the same time ... the Export-
·Import Bank ... was loaning liberally to such economically unstable count-
ries as Haiti and Bangladesh. 1124 
Then in August 1971 the Export-Import Bank announced that Chile 
could expect no more loans or guarantees. The State Department indicated 
25 
that this decision was "made on the White House level." The Nixon admini-
stration, then, was intent on erecting a credit blockade, arid pressure was 
successfully exerted on the multi-lateral banks toward the attainment of 
this goal. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank 
were instructed to "reject all requests for loans to countries that expro-
. 26 priate North American holdings without compensation." Also AID "immedi-
ately cut off all U.S. aid tq Chile from the moment of Allende's victory, 
and even went so far as to refuse to disburse loans signed with the pre-
27 
vious Chilean government." 
In addition to the invisible blockade enacted by the U.S. govern-
ment, multi-national corporations with interests in Chile, also implemented 
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plans to disrupt the Chilean economy. On September 28, 1971, Merriam, in 
an ITT memo, put forward an 18-point plan of action to overthrow Allende. 28 
He proposed this plan to the White Hous1~ with the recommendation "that 
everything should be done quietly but effectively to see that Allende does 
not get through the crucial next six months. 1129 As revealed by earlier 
memos, ITT was heavily involved in scheming against Allende and the U.P. 
government. However, there is no evidence tha~ the ITT ind5vidually 
attempted to implement Merriam's 18-point plan, though the events that 
actually occurred bore a striking resemblance to the plan. Credit and 
loans were restricted; there was a dollar shortage in Chile; the CIA was 
involved; right-wing sources were funded. This is not to suggest that 
ITT initiated American foreign policy at this time, though its sugges-
tions were obviously listened to. 
ITT's actual involvement from late 1971 onwards was unclear 
because of the lack of memos, however, Anaconda and Kennecott maneuvered 
openly against the Allende government. These two U.S. copper companies 
were nationalized by Allende and they were determined to fight to get what 
they felt was adequate compensation. Kennecott attempted to disrupt Chil-
ean copper sales to Western European countries by legal means, by the 
announcement that they (Kennecott) regarded the copper as their property. 
Legal action on this basis was initiated in France, and had some success. 
"Kennecott also successfully initiated a similar action in a German court 
(Hamburg, on January 5, 1973)."30 
Paul Sigmund may have balked at calling these measures an "invis-
ible blockade," however, I think without doubt the actions taken by the 
U.S. government and private corporations, collectively constituted a con-
sciously planned blockade. An assessment of the effect of th·is blockade 
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will not only reinforce the reality of its very existence, but will also 
help to answer the question, "to what extent was the U.S. responsible for 
the overthrow of Salvador Allende?" 
An assessment of the situation must start with the early hard-
line policy of the Export-Import Bank, as this was to set the tone for 
what was to follow. Their refusal to give loans to Chile was an indicator 
to private banks and countries around the worle that the U.S. had "black-
balled" Chile. The Export-Import Bank has great influence and its refusal 
to grant loans, certainly encouraged others to follow their lead. 
One of the most important points that needs to be stressed is that 
Chile was a dependent economy dependent on the U.S., as a result of having 
receivedlarge amounts of money,:for many years, from the Alliance for Pro-
gress. Hence Chile needed dollars to import parts for U.S. machines and 
vehicles, for fertilizers, medicines and food available only from the 
United States. 31 The U.S. was well aware that the Chilean economy was 
closely tied to them and consequently they (the U.S.) knew the harmful 
effect their blockade would have. 32 Sigmund maintained that Chile was 
able to acquire "alternative sources of loans and credit to Chile which 
more than counter-balanced reductions from U.S. and U.S. influenced 
sources. 1133 Admittedly Chile received credits from a variety of sources; 
mainly other Latin American countries. The most significant credits, 
though, came from socialist countries; the USSR topped the list with $259 
·11· 34 mi 1.on. However, they were mainly medium and long-term credits to be 
used for importing capital or transport equipment. What Chile needed was 
short-term credit for consumer items and replacement parts for machines. 
Because of the high level of dependency on the U.S., Chile needed short-
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term credit, and it needed it in dollars. This was reflected in the fact 
that only a fraction of the loans committed to the Allende government by 
the socialist countries had ever been disbursed and utilized. 35 These 
alternative sources of credit, then, in no way "counter-balanced" the 
restrictive policies of the U.S., but in reality they did great damage to 
the Chilean economy. The credit cutback caused a halt in existing pro-
duction and expansion and facilitated unemployment and inflation • 
• 
Economic disruption by both the domestic opposition and the U.S. 
had helped to cause problems in the state sector, which at this time was 
exapnding under the auspices of the U.P. program. However, as it expanded 
huge deficits were incurred and as a result inflation increased rapidly. 
Allende had also felt it necessary to increase the money supply by 100 
percent. In addition, the workers' wages were being eroded by inflation 
and a black market had developed in certain food stuffs and textiles and 
automobile parts. The net result of this inflationary situation was that 
the annual rate of inflation for 1972 rose to 40 percent. By the time of 
the final coup d'etat, inflation had risen to over 100 percent. 
From this economic chaos, discontent and political polarization 
quickly followed. The U.S. also attempted to pressure Chile by making her 
foreign debt renegotiations with the Paris Club, in April 1972, conditional 
upon compensation being paid for the nationalized U.S. copper companies. 
However, the other members of the Paris Club (who were mainly European), 
bilaterally negotiated the rescheduling of the debt Chile owed them. The 
U.S. failed, then, to internationally isolate Chile, but nevertheless the 
U.S. itself still refused to renegotiate and, as Kyle Steenland pointed 
out at the time, this was of crucial importance as "Chile 1 s foreign reserves 
are extremely low and its shortage of dollars is notorious. 1136 The Paris 
Club renegotiations, then, cannot be used as an argument to lessen the 
impact of the U.S.'s role. 
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The r,~sultant lack of foreign exchange should not be underesti-
mated in its effect on the evolving situation in Chile during 1972. The 
scarcity of foreign exchange forced the Allende government to use what 
was available to buy food and spare parts and cut back on consumer goods. 
This caused discontent among the middle-class who were the main consumers 
of U.S. style goods, and as the situation worsened and polarized, they 
went over to the right-wing camp. Evidently, they became active sup-
porters of a coup d'etat solution. As Farnsworth pointed out, by the 
above action, "U.S. policy facilitated the right-wing's organizing efforts. 1137 
This, then, was the second facet of the "destabilization" policy, 
the facilitating, financing and encouragement of right-wing organizational 
strength which would create the basis for a military intervention. O'Brien 
took rather a simplistic view of this. "When one looksa.at:.:the.::continuous 
series of mass mobilizations of the Right in December 1971, March 1972, 
October 1972, May-June 1973, and August 1973 (just to tally up the peaks 
of frenzy reached by the opposition campaign) it would surely be giving 
to much credit to the CIA's political and organizational ability to claim 
that it or any U.S. agency was responsible for these movements •.. 1138 
Few, I think, would question this analysis; the idea that the CIA could 
have singlehandedly created such demonstrations was not feasible. However, 
O'Brien does not analyze the situation correctly or at least does not place 
it in a relevant context. The United States' invisible blockade had signi-
ficantly helped to create economic conditions which resulted in much middle 
and upper-class discontent. The polarization process had begun, and the 
81 
stage was set. Following on from this the role of the CIA was to "organ-
ize and politically direct that discontent. 1139 
They did this partly by financing opposition activities and demon-
strations, a prime example of this being the truck-owners' strike " . ... ev1-
denced by the large influx of dollars which ... stabilized for over a month 
the price of the dollar on the black market. 1140 The Sunday Times (London) 
also claimed that Chileans from the gremios ana unions were trained in 
Amer.1.ca and returned to become "the cadres for the truck owners and other 
Right-wing strikes. 1141 Money was also poured into El Mecurio,·an extremely 
conservative newspaper, in order to foment right-wing ideas and activities. 
The increasing number of unannounced U.S. officials operating in Chile at 
this time, reflected this committment to organizing opposition activities. 
The State Department officially listed only 89 functionaries in Chile, 
however, there were other claims that there were over 1100. 42 Also the 
"pots and pans" demonstration by middle-class housewives in Santiago 
against Allende was strikingly similar to the 1963 "pots and pans demon-
stration in Sao Paulo, Brazil, which preceded the junta coup against the 
Goulart government."43 A coup which the U.S. had been successfully 
involved in and was now seemingly trying to repeat its tactics. 
However, the crucial group remained the armed forces, as there 
could be no overthrow without their support and participation. The U.S. 
realized this and had always maintained close links with the Chilean 
armed forces. The stance of the U.S. was clearly revealed during the 
"invisible blockade" in that military aid was exempt from it. In fact, 
during the Allende years, U.S. military aid increased: in fiscal year 
ending 1970 it was $800,000; by mid-1971 it had increased to $5.7 million; 
and in 1971-72 it was $12.3 million. 44 The majority of the navy and air 
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force officers eventually came round to the idea of bringing about a coup. 
As the polarization deepened the military purged its ranks, and became 
ready to act. Without doubt, 11 U. S. military officials encouraged their 
Chilean counterparts to act. 11 45 
In the final assessment of the U.S. role, it must be noted that 
considerable sums of money were spent assisting right-wing groups and the 
military. Advice and technical assistance were also given amply. 
• 
The 
"invisible blockade" did exist and it did great damage to the Chilean 
economy, and the polarization process was intensified by U.S. actions. 
Some observers assessed the situation as being one in which 11 ••• 
The United States assisted in the making of the Chilean coup, but was not 
the prime promoter of the coup. 1146 This has a certain amount of validity, 
but it does not fully convey the impact that U.S. involvement had. I 
admit that there was by October 1972, the emergence of civilian and mili-
tary groups determined to overthrow Allende. This emergence and organiza-
tion was a response to the internal class struggle. These two factors--
the internal class struggle and U.S. involvement--were so closely tied that 
neither factor on its own can be labelled "prime promoter." I don't see 
the situation in Chile as having been the result of purely Chilean forces 
or solely of machinations by the U.S. government and agencies. However, 
an assessment which pigeonholes U.S. involvement as "assisting in the 
Chilean coup", relegates it to an unjustified secondary role. The U.S. 
was massively involved, directly and indirectly and the part they played 
should in no way be underestimated. 
The coup became, then, the combined efforts of the shared interests 
of the U.S. and the Chilean bourgeoisie and their military allies. 47 
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CHAPTER V 
THE M.I.R. (MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT) 
Hypothesis: Although the M.I.R.'s activities caused the U.P. to move to 
the left on certain occasions, it cannot be heid responsible for provoking 
the Rightist offensive. 
Prior to the 1970 election of Salvador Allende there were four 
principal factions which made up the revolutionary left in Chile at that 
time. These consisted of: (1) The left wing of the Socialist Party, 
within which there existed a guerrilla wing. However, it always remained 
part of the main Socialist Party, and the U.P. coalition, although as the 
polarization process intensified it often fo\llld itself advocating solu-
tions which were clearly outside Allende's "constitutionalist" strategy. 
(2) Maoism was represented in the revolutionary left by the Revolutionary 
Communist Party (P.C.R.). Although it was a small party it had had acer-
tain amount of influence among the students of Santiago. However, its 
demise was greatly enhanced by its call for a mass boycott of voting for 
Allende in order to illustrate the uselessness of the electoral road to 
socialism. Allende's electoral victory, then, plus his avowed desire to 
recognize Red China, syphoned off much of the P.C.R.'s internal and 
external support. (3) A collection of micro-groups, mostly Trotskyist, 
who remained largely underground, and their activities were limited to 
small-scale terrorism. 1 The,fourth and most important faction of the 
revolutionary left was the M.I.R. (Movement of the Revolutionary Left). 
This was formed in 1965 "from a variety of left-wing factions, notably 
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Trotskyites and dissident socialists. 112 Though as Evans pointed out, 
"The M.I.R. began as a Castroist current," with many of its ideas and 
strategies originating directly from those employed by the Fidelists in 
Cuba. 113 The M.I.R. was initially organized at the University of Concep-
cio.n from students and other leftist groups. From these humble beginnings 
the M.I.R. evolved to become the most powerful of the insurrectional organ-
izations; the only one that made any significa.it inroads among students 
and slum dwellers, and sustained its underground activities. Groups which 
it initiated and which came under its influence, comprised the Revolution-
ary Peasant Movement among Indians and migrant farm workers; the Front of 
Revolutionary Workers in the factories, and the Movement of Revolutionary 
Slum Dwellers in the "callampas" and campamentos. 114 In addition the M.I.R. 
organized the University Movement of the Left for college students and the 
Front of Revolutionary Students for high school students of twelve years 
5 
and up. 
The M.I.R. was organizing sections of the masses, especially home-
. 6 
less people, well before the election of Allende. This organizing con-
tinued throughout the Presidential election campaign of 1970, and although 
they did not openly support Allende, it seemed as though they did not act-
ively oppose him, as they refrained from armed guerrilla actions during 
this period. The M.I.R. did not believe in the electoral road to socialism, 
and this had been one of the main reasons why they had not attempted to 
formally ally themselves with the U.P. They often criticized the U.P. 
for its insistence on following such a strategy. Peaceful revolution was 
impossible and armed struggle was inevitable. "The seizing of power by 
the workers," they wrote, "will be possible only through armed struggle." 
The ruling class will not surrender its power without a struggle and revo-
lutionary war is the inevitable result. 7 
The victory of Allende on September 4, 1970, not surprisingly, 
threw the different factions of the revolutionary left into disarray. 
Their philosophy of the non-viability of the "electoral road" had, at 
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this point, seemingly been repudiated. The M.I.R. and the left-wing of 
the Socialist Party were the only two groups of the "ultra-left" to 
successfully weather this crisis. As outlined above the M.I.R. gave 
the U.P. critical support, but was always pessimistic about Allende's 
chances of being elected or inaugurated. When Allende became president, 
the M.I.R. was faced with the problem of what course to follow. As Evans 
said, "Should it support the government or continue preparing for guerrilla 
8 
war?" Initially it attempted to do both, though as the polarization pro-
cess intensified, it became increasingly critical of the reformist line 
of the U.P., and in particular, the Communist Party. 
Its activities within the government were mainly in the area of 
intelligence and security, rather than policy making. Allende used 
MIRistas to form his personal guard (a move which was criticized by the 
Right). However, the M.I.R. was not part of the U.P. coalition and only 
gave it tacit support and consequently most of their activities were 
carried out outside the government apparatus. 
The main role of the M.I.R. was to "dedicate themselves to the 
mobilization of workers and students," because for them" ... the workers 
have already gained the right to make the foreign enterprises, the banks, 
9 
the factories, and the land, the property of all the people." The M.I.R. 
seemed to have taken upon itself the role of the revolutionary conscience 
of the U.P. in that it attempted to carry out actions which would "push 
the U.P. from the left so that the U.P. would act on the most revolutionary 
aspects of its program."lO 
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This activity was most evident in the outbreak of land seizures, 
most of which occurred between November 1970 and January 1971. They 
started on a massive scale in the Mapuche Indian regions of the south 
where Mapuche peasants had traditionally claimed land from the latifundia 
as theirs and had a history of land invasion.11 These Indians and also 
non-Indian peasants were organized by the M.I.R. into the MCR (Revolu-
tionary Peasant Movement), and this movement led many of the land seizures. 
Cristobal Kay documented the dramatic rise in the number of land seizures 
under the Popular Unity government, 11 .•. in 1967, 9 seizures; in 1968, 26 
seizures; in 1969, 148 seizures; in 1970, 456 seizures; and in 1971, 
1,278 seizures. 1112 Evans saw the situation as one in which "the timeli-
ness and effectiveness of the organizational and agitational work carried 
out by the M.I.R. among the peasants have turned these actions into an 
example that is spreading like an oil slick, from the south towards the 
13 
center and north of the country." 
Allende saw that the movement of these armed peasant groups was 
spreading across the countryside, and he was afraid that a response by the 
landlords and the Right would provoke armed conflict. For Allende, this 
would be extremely bad timing as the U.P. government had not yet consoli-
dated its political power. Eventually, then, although Alle~de voiced his 
understanding of the plight of the poor and hungry peasants, his adherence 
14 to legality caused him to act. On May 16, 1971, a confrontation occurred 
between the police and landless peasants at a fundo in Santiago province. 
15 Five peasants were arrested and the rest expelled. Following this on 
July 31, the government warned that it would no longer tolerate these land 
seizures and Interior Minister, Undersecretary Daniel Vergara said, "The 
full force of the law would be used to insure that private property was 
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respected. The M.I.R. berated the government for compromising with the 
opposition; however, they eventually agreed not to carry out any more land 
seizures unless the landowner abused it or the government failed to redis-
tribtite it., 
The inportant question that needs to be asked here is: "To what 
extent did the M.I.R.'s activities push Allende to the left and conse-
quently help to precipitate the Rightist backlash?" Without doubt the 
M.I.R.'s intention in organizing and mobilizing the peasants in the 
countryside had been to try and force Allende to move to the left. They 
took over the lands and presented Allende with a "fait accompli," espe-
cially as they claimed that they were "only helping President Allende 
carry out the agrarian reform and increase production for tpe country. 1117 
To a certain extent the M.I.R. viewed their actions as supportive of 
Allende in that they were ensuring that the Right could not subvert the 
agrarian reform program. However, their actions challenged the U.P.'s 
hegemony over the mass movement, and it was in response to this that the 
U.P. government took up the challenge and rapidly but legally expropriated 
. 18 
a large number of farms throughout Chile. By this maneuver the U.P. 
outflanked the M.I.R. and took away a lot of the credit due to the M.I.R. 
for their organizational activities among the masses. This is not to 
suggest that every land seizure that took place was organized by the M.I.R. 
On the contrary, many of them were spontaneous actions by repressed and 
hungry peasants who act_ed once they realized that the armed forces would 
not be used to suppress them. 
The M.I.R. has been blamed for provoking the Right into action 
and for causing the disaffection of the middle class to the right by their 
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"ultra-leftist" activities. A more accurate analysis of the situation 
was one in which the right-wing press took advantage of the disagreements 
on the left between the M.I.R. and parts of the U.P. and exploited them 
to the full using vastly inaccurate headlines. For example, in reference 
to the land seizures, the conservative newspaper, "La Prensa," played on 
the fears of the middle classes with stories of kidnapped landowners, 
raped wives, drugged indians, and general rura.1 chaos. 19 Also, the 
"illegal" takeovers of land, many of which were carried out without the 
help of the M.I.R. "were immediately exaggerated and used by the bour-
geoise to attack the government for its inability to keep the political 
20 
process within legal confines." The bourgeois press was helped in its 
efforts to exaggerate and exploit the role of the revolutionary left by 
the Communist Party's hostility towards the M.I.R. The C.P. saw the rural 
and urban land seizures as undermining middle class support for the U.P. 
and consequently, their anger over this was directed at the M.I.R. At 
one point relations between the two parties deteriorated to such an 
extent that in December 1970, during an election campaign at the Univer-
sity of Concepcion, a gun battle broke out and an M.I.R. student was 
killed. 21 Of course these kinds of confrontations were gleefully 
accepted by the Right, and exaggerated to scare the middle class and 
moderates away from a left-wing solution and towards the right. 
Although the M.I.R. was most visible through its role in the land 
seizures it was also involved in the organization of "campamentos." The 
U.P. also was involved in this area; however, its activities were limited 
compared to those of the M. I. R., who viewed the movement "as a political 
front of the class struggle. 1122 
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During the last year and a half of the U.P. government the polari-
zation process intensified greatly and the mobilizations in the "campa-
mentos" took a qualitative leap forward in the creation of organs of 
"peoples power." These became known as "comandos comunales" (Communal 
Commands), and were created as a reaction to the "Bosses Strike" of 
October 1972. The MIRistas and militants of the Socialist Party were 
in the vanguard of the "comandos comunales" in.which workers, housewives, 
students, soldiers and the unemployed united together to take charge of 
production, distribution and defense in their communities. In the indus-
trial belts "cordones" were organized to lend solidarity to the workers 
who took over the factories. 23 
The working class's resistance to the strike caused it to eventu-
ally peter out, and unfortunately, the organs of "popular power" that had 
been created fell, at least temporarily, into disuse. However, the masses' 
socialist consciousness had been raised to new levels, and it resisted the 
return of the factories they had occupied and demanded the expropriation 
of new ones. 
The M.I.R. was involved in many other similar activities during the 
period of Popular Unity; the "gremios" strike and the abortive coup of 
June 1973, being the most important. In these latter situations the M.I.R. 
again agitated and organized among the masses in order to offer a resist-
ance against the Rightist offensive, which by this time was almost ready 
to deal its final blow. 
So far in this, chapter, then, I have tried to outline the activi-
ties that the M.I.R. was involved in and analyze the extent of that involve-
ment. Without doubt they and the left wing of the Socialist Party were 
invovled in urban and rural land seizures, and in the creation of organs 
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of "peoples power." However, a certain amount of this was spontaneous, 
though admittedly some of this spontanity may have come from the momentum 
created by the M.I.R.'s activities. Also, in certain cases the M.I.R.'s 
activities did cause Allende to move further to the left, and at a faster 
pace than he had originally intended. However, the theory that the M.I.R. 's 
activities pushed Allende off his constitutional course and hence precipi-
tated the Rightist offensive, accredits a far ~ore important revolutionary 
role to the M.I.R. than in actual fact it had. 
As the polarization process intensified so obviously did right-wing 
pre~sure.·agatni;~;.tl\e _left, _and w;i,_thin .this context,_ t9e ma!;!ses_ on the left 
c1sted to 9-~fend _t;heir c);a~s_ i~t~r.:est. - -Howev~r, the -masses _wh9 formeq the 
"cordones" and "commandos comunales", and those who so swiftly rose up to 
support Allende on the occasion of the abortive coup, were not members of 
a mass revolutionary party led and organized by the M.I.R! At no time was 
there such a party. In order to be able to accredit the M.I.R. with pre-
cipitating the Rightist offensive, the M.I.R. would have had to have been 
the leader of such an aforementioned mass revolutionary party. This was 
a position that the M.I.R. never held or acted out. In reality it had 
done some organizing and mobilizing and this, plus its conflicts with the 
rest of the left, was vastly exaggerated and exploited by the Right. The 
latter followed this course of action in order to give itself "justifica-
tion" for its offensive and eventual coup against Allende. This "theory 
of provocation" cannot accurately be applied to the M.I.R. as its organi-
zation was too weak to be held responsible for mass actions. As Roxborough, 
O'Brien and Roddick pointed out, "if the theory of provocation is seriously 
held, then it was the bulk of the working class and peasantry who were 
provocative. For it was they who took over factories and farms in response 
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to the right-wing threats of October 1972 and June 1973, and it was they 
who demanded that Allende and his government take a firm hand against 
the Right. 1124 
The M.I.R.'s role, then, was overexaggerated by the Right; however, 
this conclusion begs the other important question concerning the M.I.R.: 
"Why did it fail to gain the leadership of the masses and present itself 
as a viable revolutionary alternative to the U.P?" 
The M.I.R. had had an organizational base and significant influ-
ence in the shantytowns and poor neighborhoods of Santiago, Concepcion 
and other Chilean cities. Also, it had had links with important sectors 
of the peasantry and in the student movement. Of all the diverse and 
faction-ridden groups of the revolutionary left, the M.I.R. seemed to have 
been the "key element in forming a revolutionary rallying point, if not 
25 
itself serving as the rallying point." 
However, the M.I.R. was incapable of working out an overall, 
rigorous, revolutionary strategy, and was guilty at times of changing its 
orientations, and as a result, confusing the masses. From the time of its 
formation until Allende's election victory, the M.I.R. remained very much 
a clandestine organization, carrying out bombings and robberies to fund 
26 
its activities. When Allende came to power the M.I.R. moved towards a 
more opportunist position, critically supporting the U.P. when it felt it 
was necessary. Admittedly, much of its critical support was intended to 
protect Allende from the Right, but it also resulted in the M.I.R. failing 
to present itself as a clear revolutionary alternative to the Allende 
government. Not only that but it also failed to make clear to the workers 
how openly reformist the U.P.'s programs and policies were. As I have 
discussed in earlier chapters, Allende did not fundamentally alter the 
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the capitalist structure of Chile, and in addition strongholds of the 
bourgeois state, such as the armed forces, police, courts and constitu-
tion, were left intact. 
Although the M.I.R. ~ay have been correct in trying to protect 
the U.P. from the Right, it should at the same time have pointed out 
clearly to the masses that they should have no confidence in the U.P. 
Instead, they should have stressed more clearl~ than they did the need 
for the masses to rely on their own mobilization and create their own 
organs of power (especially a popular militia). Groups on the left, 
inside and outside the U.P. coalition, encouraged the masses to begin 
to develop their own organs of popular control. The local leadership 
of various groups were involved in this; the left wing of the S.P.; MAPU 
(United Popular Action Movement); I.C. (Christian Left); P.C.R. (Revo-
lutionary Communist Party) and the M.I.R. As Zimblast and Stallings 
pointed out the problem here was, "The fact that this leadership was not 
centralized, however, left the working class without a coherent strategy 
27 
for the conquest of state power." The M.I.R., because of its weaknesses, 
was unable to establish itself as the revolutionary leader. 
Not only did the M.I.R. display general political weaknesses, but 
it also followed incorrect policies which showed that it did not have a 
true understanding of the nature of the class struggle. 
They seemed to have had a confused policy towards the armed forces. 
On the one hand they warned the masses against the reactionary nature of 
the military and yet they entertained possibilities of "winning:the 0 armed 
f 1 f h ff . . h l . tt28 orces or arge sectors o t e o icer corps to supporting t e revo ution. 
Possibly this particular orientation in the M.I.R. camp was one of the 
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reasons why they failed to split the rank-and-file away from the officer 
corp to any significant extent. Whatever the explanations, the M.I.R., 
being a Marxist party, should have realized that in the final analysis 
of the class struggle, the vast majority of the officers would defend the 
established system against the workers. 
Another policy which the M.I.R. followed, which again seemed to 
ignore their own Marxist philosophy, was thein lack of contacts and mobil-
izing efforts among the working class. The M.I.R. did work among the 
working class; however, they (the M.I.R.) did not accord it the primacy 
which its position in the class struggle historically warranted. For 
man) years they worked with the peasants and slumdwellers; however, for 
a mass party to be built and for the revolutionary struggle to be waged 
successfully, the working class had to form its base. In the mobilizing 
and organizing that took place after the abortive coup of June 29, 1973, 
the M. I. R argued strongly that the "comandos comunales" should be the 
leading group of "peoples power," and the industrial cordones should be 
subordinate to them. 29 This downgrading of the workers' role again 
showed a misreading of the class struggle. 
Also the M.I.R. was never able to conceive of building a mass 
revolutionary party. They relied heavily on an elitist type of guerrilla 
warfare, which excluded mass involvement. Consequently, many years went 
by in which the reformist parties were able to capture ~nd strengthen 
their hold over the working class. 
The M.I.R., then, had many weaknesses which prevented it from 
becoming "a revolutionary mobilizing center to the left of the Unidad 
30 Popular." However, it had enough visibility on the far left, for the 
Right to exploit and exaggerate its activities and intra-left conflicts. 
Even with all the above points taken into consideration, however, the 
M.I.R. still played an important role. It may not have been a huge 
force on the left, but it did do some very useful mobilizing and 
organizing work and helped the masses raise their level of socialist 
consciousness. 
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The mass movement in Chile largely acquired its own momentum from 
the ongoing polarization process, but the M.I.R. played a significant 
catalyst role. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CHILE: TENTATIVE COMPARISONS WITH FRANCE AND ITALY 
Hypothesis: The "via Chilena" has important implications for European 
leftists' attempts to come to powe.r, although .any comparisons and 
speculations can only be of the most tentative nature at the present 
time. 
The Chilean Experience of 1970-73 has received much attention 
throughout the world especially in France and Italy where left-wing 
forces appear to be in a position of unprecedented strength. The ques-
tion that needs to be asked is, how similar are the political situations 
in France and Italy, and are they in any way comparable to those in 
Chile between 1970-73? If reasonable similarities can be identified 
then some limited form of specualtion concerning future left-wing coali-
tion governments in France and Italy would be useful. However, even if 
reasonable similarities cannot be found, then, this in itself would also 
be a useful conclusion. 
My first intention is to try and outline the political situation 
in France and Italy in terms of the make-up, structure and strategies of 
the differing political parties. An attempt can then be made to form 
comparisons with the Unidad Popular in Chile. 
The Italian Communist Party under Enrico Berlinguer is at the 
1 
moment acting out its strategy of the "historic compromise." In 
essence this involves dialogue with and support for the Christian Demo-
cratic minority government. The "historic compromise" was first voiced 
100 
101 
by Berlinguer in the fall of 1973. He maintained that a Communist party's 
strategy must be realistic and reflect the internal distribution of power 
in the country. Consequently, he saw that for the Italian Communist 
Party (PCI), its best strategy was not to form a left-wing coalition with 
the PSI (Italian Socialist Party), but with the center. "Great changes 
cannot be brought about by antagonizing powerful oppositions by splitting, 
as it were, society into two hostile camps. R~ther, such changes can be 
accomplished only by forging alliances with a variety of different social 
2 
groups and with the mass parties which re;,resent them." Berlinguer, as 
this quote showed, had been following the events in Chile and was attempt-
ing to ensure that his party did not suffer the same fate as Allende's 
coalition. However, this "historic compromise" was not purely a reaction 
to the events in Chile, but was also a blueprint for moving out of, and 
staying out of, political isolation. In 1962-63 the PSI joined a center-
left government with the Christian Democrats and consequently, the PCI 
was isolated. Therefore, in order to move out of this isolation it needed 
to ally itself either with the Socialists or the Catholics. 3 
During the 1970's the PCI enjoyed an upsurge in electoral support 
4 
as the regional elections in June 1975 clearly showed. The PCI then 
became the single largest party in Italy. The reasons behind their gains 
in popularity need not be delved into too deeply here; suffice it to say 
that the worsening economic crisis and thirty ye;rs of corrupt, inefficient 
DC t dd h 1 kf 1 . 5 
.. governmen , persua e t e voters to oo or new so utions. This 
new solution seemed to be the PCI rather than the PSI. The PSI had 
suffered from a long coalition with the D.C., and had lost the confidence 
of many of its voters. 6 The PSI's long-term hopes were pinned on a united-
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1975 Electoral Results in Percentages Compared to Previous Elections 
Regional National Regional 
1970* 1972 1975 
PCI (Communists) 27.9 28.9 33.4 
PSI (Socialists) 10.4 9.8 12.0 
PdUp, DP, etc., (Revolutionary 
Left)** 3.2 3.0 1. 9 
Total Left 41. 5 41.1 47.3 
D. C. (Christian Democrats) 37.8 38.4 35.3 
PSDI (Social Democrats) 7.0 5.2 5.5 
PRI (Republicans) 2.9 2.9 3.2 
PLI (Liberals) 4.8 5.9 2.5 
MSI (Fascists) 5.9 8. 1 6.3 
*In recent years the administrative regions of Italy have 
been goven increased economic, political and certain legislative powers. 
**The 1970 figure is for PSIUP candidates. The 1972 figure is 
for PSIUP Manifesto and MPL (left catholics). The 1975 figure is for 
PdUp, DP (an electoral front of Pdu7 and Avanguardia Operaia), and a 
few other revolutionary candidates. 
left coalition, but the PCI did not favour this as they were afraid of 
polarization and also they did not see the PSI as being capable of giving 
them enough support to constitute a left-wing coalition government. Hence 
the only way was for the PCI to ally themselves with the D.C. The Italian 
Socialist Party withdrew their support from the D.C. and consequently pre-
cipitated a national election in June 1976. The D.C. emerged with a 
minority government and with the realization that it would be impossible 
to govern Italy without the involvement of the PCI in some form or other. 
A bargain was struck, then, and in return for sustaining the D.C. in 
power, the PCI would receive explicit recognition of its increased import-
ance in the House and Senate, several important chairmanships, and the 
chairmanship of the House. 8 
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In a number of ways, France has some similarities with Italy. 
They both are traditionally Catholic and yet both have Communist organi-
zations which enjoy widespread popular support. However, due to the 
strategies which were inherent in the left of each country, the political 
situation on the left in France can be differentiated from that in Italy. 
Whereas in Italy the Communists and the Socialists at different times 
have allied themselves with the Catholics, the.French left has never felt 
the need to do so. The main Cabholic party in France, the MRP (Movement 
Republicain Populaire) lost much of its support in 1947 when de Gaulle 
broke his tacit alignment with them, and took over many of their con-
9 
servative voters when he formed his own "Rassemblement du People Francais." 
From then on the MRP lost votes in every subsequent election until 1967 
when it officially disbanded.lo 
In France at the present time, Catholicism as an influence on 
politics, seems minimal. There is no major Catholic political party, and 
the increase in support for th•:: parties on the left shows that religion is 
not an overriding consideration in terms of political affiliation. Although 
Catholicism is still the major religion of France, there seems little pro-
spect of a strong Catholic party coming into being in the forseeable 
future. 
In Italy, however, the situation is rather more complex. In France 
the MRP had been a party, mainly for leftists Catholics. However, the 
Italian Chtistian Democratic Party (D.C.) is the party to which almost all 
Catholics belong, regardless of class or political belief. How important 
is the "Catholic factor" in Italy at the pres.ent time, and how important 
will it be in the future? 
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Time magazine maintained that Enrico Berlinger is trying to come 
to terms with the Roman Catholic Church. They report that he recently 
sent a conciliatory open letter to an Italian bishop in which he gave 
"assurances that his party not only respects religion but sees it as a 
possible stimulus toward building a true socialist party. 1111 These quotes 
reflect the present strategy of the PCI in regards to Catholicism. Not 
only are the PCI at~empting to court the DC and the Catholic Church, but 
also the huge mass of Catholic voters in the country. 
Berlinger is aware that there is a growing trend of secularization 
in Italy, and he is trying to re-fashion the image of the PCI so that it 
can most successfully capitalize on this trend. By lessening the PCI's 
image of being hostile to religion, and by giving Catholicism a role to 
play in the building of socialism, many traditionally Catholic voters can 
be won over to the communist camp. 
The table below illustrates the changing portion of the public who 
view communism and Catholicism as compatible. In addition to the statis-
tics shown in this table, recent electoral performances reflect this 
diminishing influence of the Church in political matters. The DC was 
defeated in the 1974 Divorce Referendum, and the PCI gained substantial 
support in both the 1975 regional elections and the 1976 national elec-
tions.12 
If this secularization trend continues, and the signs are that it 
will, it will be interesting to see how many traditionally Catholic voters 
the PCI can woo away from the DC. If it is successful at this, it may 
replace the DC as the largest political party in Italy, and if this happens, 
the DC may be forced to relinquish their tenuous control of the government. 
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This aforementioned lack of a Catholic party in France meant that 
the parties on the left in France, the PCF and the PSI, had to ally them-
selves with each other in their search for electoral victory. Eventually 
in 1972 the two parties formulated the Common Programme with the smaller 
14 Left-Radical party. Without doubt the progrannne was weighted in favour 
of the Socialists as they were the stronger party, and this resulted in 
tensions in the coalition as the PCF always envisaged themselves as the 
"vanguard" of the Left. Whatever the tensions between the three parties 
of the Common Programme, they are all aware that their best chance to win 
the national elections is to remain united. Their unity so far has brought 
them significant electoral success. In 1974 the Presidential candidate of 
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the Left, Francois Mitterand, came within a percentage point of defeating 
Valery Gisgard d'Estaing in the race for the Presidency. 
In the cantonal elections in the spring of 1976, the Left, for 
the first time since the formation of the "Fifth Republic," gained an 
absolute majority of the votes cast on the first ballot, 56.4 percent 
(Socialists, 26.5 percent; Communists, 22.8 percent, and other parties 
the remainder). These levels of support have Qeen sustained in the parlia-
mentary by-elections of November 1976 and the municipal elections of March 
1977. If this trend is continued in the General Election of spring 1978, 
then the Left is likely to obtain a parliamentary majority. 15 
As in Italy this move to the left by the electorate was in part 
prompted by the worsening economic conditions that the West as a whole was 
experiencing. In 1974 the French rate of GNP growth moved in negative 
figures, the rate of inflation went over 15 percent, and unemployment 
exceeded 500,000 for the first time since World War Ir. 16 
In both Italy and France, then, in the 1970's Communist parties 
have enjoyed an upsurge in support. As I have indicated this has partly 
happened as a reaction to socio-economic conditions and also dissatisfac-
tion with the existing leadership. However, it also reflects the fact 
that both the French and Italian Communists have made great efforts to 
publicize their acceptance of democracy and their distance from Moscow and 
hence, hopefully, their acceptance by the electorate. Can the "historic 
compromise" situation in Italy and the "Union of the Left" in France be 
compared in any useful way to the Unidad Popular coalition in Chile? 
The Unidad Popular was also a coalition mainly involving the two 
main working class parties, the Socialists and the Communists, as in 
France. The U.P. did contain some small center-left parties; however, 
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the strategy of Allende in the earlier part of the government was not to 
form a "historic compromise" of his own with the Chilean Christian Demo-
crats. The reason being that he did not need to, as he had won a plurality 
17 
of the vote. Once he had accepted the "constitutional guarantees," he 
was legally able to govern by the support of his own coalition. However, 
in the closing stages of the Allende government, overtures were made to 
the Christian Democrats in an effort to halt t~e increasing political 
polarization process. 18 A strategy which by then had no hope of working 
as the class struggle had become too intense for a compromise solution to 
be successful. 
The similarity here is especially strong as regards Italy. Ber-
linguer saw the implications of the Chilean tragedy very clearly. Allende 
had won a plurality, not an absolute majority of the vote and consequently, 
he was faced constantly by an opposition which had almost as much support 
as he did. An opposition which was not only entrenched in the governmental 
institutions, but throughout the middle and upper classes of the entire 
country. As we know, the result was political polarization and the des-
truction of the Unidad Popular. 
Berlingueris faced with a similar problem. By a combination of 
alliances on the Left and a future increase in electoral su~port, theoreti-
cally a Left coalition could come to power in Italy. However, any increase 
in support would still leave a large DC party and a staunch Catholic elec-
torate behind it, in opposition. For Berlinguer and the Communists this 
scenario is frighteningly similar to Chile, and hence they have for the 
time being decided to pursue their "historic compromise." 
The failure of the "via Chilena" obviously caused much theorizing 
among the Y-rench and Italian Connnunist parties concerning the prospects of 
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a peaceful road to socialism. The prospects for a peaceful way were sub-
jected to further scrutiny by the events in Indochina in the spring and 
summer of 1975. Here it seemed the opposite strategy, that of armed 
struggle had succeeded. In South Vietnam the sudden collapse of Thieu's 
regime's military resistance quickly led to the Communist takeover in 
Saigon on April 30. As Tiersky pointed out, " ..• the Thieu regime had 
been finally peaten down by military force rat.her than by political 
machination," and this "served to amplify the signal of a power transfer 
in Southeast Asia as a whole. 1119 The Italian Communists' assessment seems 
to remain the same and the French CP's assessment also, at least publicly, 
does not seem to have wavered from a commitment to the peaceful road. 
However, in the aftermath of the Armed Forces Movement revolution of April 
25, 1974 in Portugal, the PCF declared complete solidarity with the Portu-
guese Communist Party (PCP). The leader of whom, Alvaro Cunhal, had 
declared that there would be "no parliament in Portugal. 1120 By such 
actions the PCF strained the tensions inherent in the "union of the left" 
and also brought into question its commitment to democratic procedures. 
The basic tenets of the Common Programme are, by design, vague, 
but as it is likely that the Socialists would be the controlling force in 
a left-wing coalition government, the wording would be interpreted in their 
more moderate fashion. Both the Unidad Popular program and the Common 
Programme call for certain basic social reforms, such as reorganizing the 
economy more socialistically, income redistribution and institutional 
reform. 21 However, given the above, that the French socialists are likely 
to be administering the program, its impact would presumably not be as 
great as that of Allende's program, and hence possibly not invoke such a 
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violent response. Neither program was or is a program that would destroy 
capitalism, but Allende's was the more radical. It was mainly intended 
as a program to "lose on". In other words, the reality of victory was not 
seriously considered at the time the program was drawn up, and hence it 
became more of a radical rallying call than a more moderate program to 
"win on". However, Allende won and came to power having promised to 
carry out relatively radical reforms; reforms which evoked a rightist 
offensive against him and his eventual downfall. This election victory, 
which reflected the increased support for the left, was partly a response 
to the socio-economic conditions prevailing in Chile. Large-scale poverty, 
economic instability, inflation and the unfulfilled expectations generated 
by Frei's "Revolution in Liberty" were the conditions Allende inherited. 22 
Obviously, this socio-economic condition was far worse than those now 
prevailing in France or Italy, and hence any rigid comparisons would be 
of a precarious nature. However, a trend of worsening socio-economic con-
ditions could and can be seen in all three countries. 
Chile, France and Italy, then, all suffered a trend of worsening 
socio-economic conditions and dissatisfaction with the existing administa-
tion. Partly as a consequence of these factors, they all experienced an 
upsurge of support for parties on the left. Also they have had to deal 
with strong Christian Democratic parties (especially in Chile and Italy), 
and a large section of the electorate which is of the Catholic faith. 
Given such a background, the Unidad Popular came to power. What are the 
chances of leftist parties in France or Italy duplicating this feat, and 
if either of them do, what form is it likely to take; and are they likely 
to run into problems similar to those that Allende faced? 
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At the present time the "Union of the Left" in France seems the 
most likely candidate to "formally" come to power in the Spring Legis-
lative elections in 1978. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, their 
support has been increasing in re~ent cantonal and municipal elections, 
. . 23 
and the trend, if continued, should ensure the left a le6islative maJority. 
In addition, the French President has not only been losing support to the 
left, but he has also been under attack from tRe Gaulist Right. 24 
Although this cannot be directly compared to the right-wing split in 
Chile which allowed Allende to gain victory, dissension between the ele-
ments of the center-right in France may be important if and when the left 
becomes elected and begins to carry out its program. Presuming the "Union 
of the Left" does win the spring elections, the spirit of the program is 
most likely to be interpreted and implemented by the Socialists. However, 
the PCF will constantly try to push the Soc5alists into interpreting the 
program more radically and at a faster pace. In some ways this would be 
similar to the role that the MIR played in Chile, although they were not 
a part of the governing coalition and were more "ultra-left" than the PCF. 
A governing coalition of the left in France seems destined to be 
riddled with tension and conflict. The parties on the coalition may not 
act in a very united fashion, as indicated by their present conflict (re-
September-October 1977). In addition it is quite possible that the Right 
will react to a Communist-Socialist government with some degree of economic 
sabotage, just as the Right did in Chile. This could cause worsening socio-
economic conditions and political polarization. This would seem to set it 
down a path similar to that trod by the U.P. However, the theory that the 
situation could reach such a crisis point that the army would attempt a 
111 
coup d'etat seems an extremely unlikely scenario for a country such as 
25 France. 
The situation at the moment (September-October 1977) is one in 
which the PCF has recently made its latest attack upon the Connnon Progrannne 
and has seemingly withdrawn its support from the "Union of the Left." Some 
of this conflict is over the number of ind,ustries to be nationalized and 
in general over the reformist nature of the program. 26 However, the con-
flict is also over the PF's "ranking" in the coalition, and consequently, 
this latest PCF maneuver may be an attempt to "jockey" for position within 
the coalition in terms of trying to secure the best cabinet positions that 
it possibly can. However, it is also a distinct possibility that the PCF 
will pull out of the Union of the Left for good. It is still too far away 
from the date of the elections to make any definite statements concerning 
this at the moment. 
Another similarity to Chile can be seen in the fact that a "Union 
of the Left" government will not control all the governmental institutions, 
just as Allende did not. Allende controlled the presidency but not the 
legislature. whereas in France, the Left would control the legislature but 
not the presidency. The French Presidential election is set for 1981 and 
if things go badly for the Left in the early stages, there is no reason why 
Giscard d'Estaing could not win re-election. 27 The possibility exists, 
then, for a constitutional crisis to develop in France similar to the 
actions of the opposition in Congress in Chile, blocking Allende's pro-
posals. Though, of course, in France, the institutional situation would 
be reversed. 
A number of different scenarios can be depicted and I have specu-
lated on some of them. However, as far as the future is concerned, the 
three more probable scenarios seem to be: 
a) The "Union of the Left" will fail to unify for 
the spring 1978 legislative elections, and hence 
will fail to win the election or at the very least 
seriously jeopardize their chances of electoral 
success. 
b) The "Union of the Left" will come to power, but 
after a short period of time will be racked by 
internal dissension and political and economic 
pressure from the Right. As a result the coali-
tion will collapse most probably by a withdrawal 
of support by the PCF. 
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c) The "Union of the Left" will come to power and the 
French Socialists will follow a moderate course and 
act in the mold of a social democratic party like the 
British Labour Party. The PCF will act as their left-
wing conscience, but will be tempered by the respons-
ibilities of office. 
In Italy the situation does not indicate any great changes in the 
future. At the moment the PC! seems intent on continuing and consolidating 
its alliance with the D.C. as part of their historic compromise strategy. 
Berlinguer obviously sees the situation as being similar enough to the 
events in Chile for him to shy away from a united left coalition with the 
PSI against the Christian Democrats. However, the Connnunists can be 
expected to ask for payment for their political support in the shape of 
cabinet seats and program reforms. If it became clear that none of these 
were to be forthcoming to the satisfaction of the PCI, it is quite possible 
that at some time in the future they would withdraw their support. The 
probable outcome would be new elections and continued bargaining concerning 
the possible make-up of a governing coalition. However, the D.C. realizes 
that the Communist Party commands almost as much support as they do, and 
consequently, whatever governing combination is experimented with, it must 
take full account of the position and strength of the PCI. 
If the PC! cannot deliver some of its program reforms to its 
followers.by the tactic of the "historic compromise, then they may begin 
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to lose support. There are three main parties of the revolutionary left 
in Italy--the Avanguardia Operaia, the Hotta Continua, and the PdUp. 28 
The tactics of the PC! could leave a vacuum on the left into which any or 
all of these could move. 29 
Certain aspects of the Chilean experience, then, can be seen 
reflected in the politics of the left in France and in Italy. These 
similarities lead to some interesting speculat~ons for left-wing parties 
in France and Italy. However, the political situations in each of the 
three countries in question are not so similar as to allow really rigid 
comparisons or rigid extrapolations of events from one to another. As I 
have tried to illustrate, certain aspects can be co~pared, but these com-
parisons must be of a limited nature and the specualtions tentative. Even 
so, there is no doubt that the "via Chilena" has important implications 
for left-wing parties in Europe, and without doubt had, and will have, an 
effect upon their political behavior. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have tried to analyze the intensifying political 
polarization and the heightening of the class struggle until its culmina-
tion in the violent overthrow of Salvador Allende. The focus has been on 
the Unidad Popular government and their attempts to carry out their pro-
gram while faced with growing opposition from the domestic Right and the 
United States. The key themes concerned the speed at which the U.P. 
program should be implemented and Allende's policy of being overtly com-
promising with the opposition. 
Ultimately, the matter comes back to a question of strategy. 
Allende picked a strategy which turned out to be peaceful, reformist, and 
often times slow. It is this strategy and Allende's handling of it that 
I have tried to criticize. A peaceful road to socialism is not such an 
unfeasible idea, if and only if, the proponents of this peaceful road 
recognize and prepare for the inevitability of a violent confrontation at 
some stage. This may sound paradoxical but it can be distinguished from 
a purely violent strategy of building socialism. The latter strategy 
preaches from the outset that participation in the system is meaningless 
and that it must be overthrown by a workers' insurrection or some form of 
coup. Fidel Castro's takeover in Cuba was an example of this latter type. 
However, the situation in Chile was differe~t. A populist government had 
been elected which contained two very strong working class parties. To 
the left of them was a small, vigorous, but mainly ineffective group (in 
terms of revolutionary leadership) called the Movement of the Revolutionary 
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Left (M.I.R.). Given the relative strength and support for the existing 
political parties in Chile in 1970, any advance towards socialism had to 
be done under the auspices of the U.P. 
One of Allende's biggest mistakes was that he did not mobilize 
his supporters~ the workers, and prepare for the inevitability of violent 
confrontation, even though the Right was consolidating its position and 
openly challenging the U.P. government, both legally and illegally. 
A whole history of class struggles throughout the world and speci-
fically the events in Chile, bring me to the conclusion that a completely 
peaceful road to socialism is impossible. No ruling class has ever yet 
given up their money, capital, and power without a fight, and I see no 
prospect that they ever would. However, in certain countries such as 
Chile, and possibly in the future, France and Italy, the use of the elec-
toral process and populist programs could be followed advantageously up 
to a certain point. Once this point is resched the benefits to be accrued 
from working within the system are outweighed by the restraints of being 
shackled by it. As I have tried to show, Allende used the system advant-
ageously during his first six months, but he did not recognize the situ-
ation, post-April 1971, as being one from which he could advance more 
radically and rapidly towards socialism. Allende's own adherence to con-
stitutionality persisted even though his opponents were themselves clearly 
operating outside of the constitution. Probably Allende's last chances 
to break away from the shackles the peaceful road was imposing on him 
were in October 1972 and June 1973. These were, respectively, the "Bosses 
Strike" and the abortive coup d'etat. The workers' response to these events 
showed clearly that they were prepared to move into the violent con-
frontation "stage" of the peaceful road to socialism. 
ll8 
Allende did not provide the leadership they needed and the 
ensuing desperate compromises he attempted could not prevent the Right 
from overthrowing him. 
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